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Abstract: 
Production of urban space is an indispensable component of capitalism. Without production of urban 
space, capitalism cannot sustain capital accumulation and cope with over-accumulation crises. 
However, as environmental consciousness grows, urban development projects are increasingly 
exposed to green pressures and demands because of their associated eco-climatic impacts. One 
possible way for capitalists to reconcile such pressures and demands with capital accumulation is to 
develop sustainable ‘capitalist’ cities that rely heavily on techno-fixes. However, to make such 
‘techno-fixed’ capitalist cities really sustainable from the ‘true’ sustainability perspective is a tall 
task. Thus, a more feasible and pragmatic strategy for capitalists is to greenwash their urban 
development projects.  
 
By greenwashing, a capitalist urban project can not only seemingly adapt to green pressures, but also 
increase its exchange values by satisfying the lucrative green demands of environmentally conscious 
rich consumers. Thus, urban greenwashing can be theorized to have two functions: (1) obscuring 
environmental damages associated with a project, while, (2) increasing the exchange value of the 
project. These two functions can be empirically confirmed by analyzing the relation between (i) the 
degree of environmental destruction associated with the project and (ii) the degree of ‘promised (or 
advertised)’ greenness of the project; and the relation between (ii) and (iii) the price level of the 
project. 
 
If we can observe a positive relation between (i) a level of environmental destruction and (ii) a 
promised greenness, we can conclude that the promised greenness of the project is used, as a 
greenwashing function (1), for obscuring its environmental damage (and this means, by definition, 
the project is greenwashed). Similarly, if we can observe a positive relation between (ii) the 
promised greenness and (iii) a price level, we can conclude that the promised greenness of the 
project is used, as a greenwashing function (2), for enhancing market competitiveness, and thus the 
exchange value, of the project. Based on an urban greenwashing framework developed in this thesis 
and using Iskandar Malaysia project as a case study, this thesis operationalizes and quantifies (i) the 
environmental destruction; (ii) the promised greenness; and (iii) the price level of 38 target 
residential projects within the Iskandar region, and empirically confirmed positive relations between 
(i)-(ii) and (ii)-(iii). 
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Introduction 
  
Iskandar Malaysia [is] a smart city template – protecting the environment, 
promoting equitable development and addressing urban development challenges 
[through] the creation of smart, livable urban communities that will yield an 
improved quality of life for thousands of citizens, with safer, cleaner, healthier, 
more affordable and more vibrant neighborhoods, serviced by more efficient and 
accessible transportation systems – great destinations for businesses. (Najib 
Razak, Malaysia’s current Prime Minister, cited in The Guardian by F. 
Harvey 2012 Nov 2nd) 
 
“A strong and Sustainable Metropolis of International standing” 
(Iskandar Malaysia Vision1) 
 
The problem with green consumerism is that, although buying a "green" product 
may be the "lesser of two evils," it still operates within a neoliberal, capitalist 
context that is more concerned with making a profit than with saving the 
environment. (Budinsky and Bryant 2013:208) 
 
Capitalist production of urban space and greenwashing: 
As Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey proclaimed, today’s large-scale expansions (production 
of urban space) and re-configurations of urban space (re-production of urban space) are a vital 
component of the capital accumulation process of capitalism. Such capitalist (re)production of 
urban space has been making many socio-ecological problems such as dispossession of lands, 
gentrification, socio-economic segregation, pollution, urban consumerism, unsustainable 
urban metabolism, environmental destruction, and increasing CO2 emissions. Thus, as climate 
change is increasingly seen to pose serious environmental threats to human lives and 
livelihoods, eco-climatic sustainability2 of cities has become a pivotal issue. One study 
estimates that by 2030 approximately 1.2 million km2 of lands, which is almost equal to the 
Republic of South Africa, will be converted to urban areas (Seto, Güneralp, and Hutyra 2012). 
                                            
1 http://www.irda.com.my/vision-mission.htm 
2 Hereafter, eco-climatic sustainability shall be simply called ‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable.’ 
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This massive conversion of lands entails massive destruction of vegetation and ecosystems, of 
biodiversity, and the reduction of CO2 absorption capacity of the planet. In addition, many 
studies point out that cities are a primary contributor to global warming. For instance, 
UN-Habitat estimates that urban activities are responsible for almost 70 % of the total 
anthropogenic emissions of green house gas (2011). Thus, as concern for eco-climatic issues 
becomes ever stronger, capitalist (re)production of urban space is increasingly exposed to 
pressures and demands to be eco-friendly, sustainable, low-carbon, or simply green. 
 
How can capitalism respond to such ‘green’ pressures in order to continue its (re)production 
of urban space that is an indispensable driver of its own further accumulation? Is it possible 
for capitalism to even promote capital accumulation by responding to ‘green demands’? A 
plausible and simple answer to these questions may be to reconcile capital accumulation 
(through production of urban space) with sustainability. It is argued that such sustainable 
‘capitalist’ urban projects (some of them aim at building completely new cities) can attain 
both sustainability and more economic growth. This can be done, according to major 
discourses within the camp of sustainable urban development, by introducing eco-friendly, 
energy-efficient, and low-carbon urban planning and technologies such as more efficient 
transportation systems and renewable energy infrastructures (New York City 2006; Sioufi 
2010; UN-Habitat 2011; Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2013; UN 2014; Arup3 
2015). Corresponding to this sustainable ‘capitalist city’ agenda, the number of new 
“sustainable” urban projects, especially larger ones, has been mushrooming (See Table 1). 
(Note that, in this thesis, I use the terms “production of urban space” and “urban projects” to 
refer to relatively larger-scale capitalist green-field developments.) 
 
Such sustainable capitalist cities that rely heavily on techno-fixes have, however, been 
                                            
3 Arup is an international company specialized in architectural and urban designs. The company deals with many green 
urban projects. 
Tateishi (2015) 
 3 
contested with the arguments that modern capitalist cities (and their production process) are 
fundamentally4 eco-unfriendly and fossil-fuel-dependent. Thus, some scholars (e.g., Rees 
19975; Hornborg 20146; Latouche 2010 and 20137) even argue that the notions of sustainable 
“capitalist” city and sustainable “capitalist” urban development are an oxymoron or a myth. If 
so, how can strategies to continue capitalist (re)production of urban space amidst the green 
pressures and demands actually look like? In what way can, in effect, today’s increasing 
number of green urban projects be interpreted? An effective theoretical framework to analyze 
these issues is greenwashing, which is “the act of misleading consumers regarding the 
environmental practices of a company (firm-level greenwashing) or the environmental 
benefits of a product or service (product-level greenwashing)” (Delmas and Burbano 2011). 
 
As consumers in the capitalist societies become concerned for eco-climatic issues, green 
marketing of products and companies has become crucial for corporations to attract green 
demands (Chang 2011; Delmas and Burbano 2011; Chen and Chang 2013; Nyilasy, 
Gangadharbatla, and Paladino 2014). However, “being green” and/or “to be green” are a tall 
task for many companies due to several reasons (e.g., huge costs, firm characteristics, 
inappropriate incentive structure etc.). Thus, it has been observed that many companies 
employ greenwashing “to selectively reveal the positive information about the environmental 
features of their products without disclosing negative information in order to generate green 
image” (Chen, Lin, and Chang 2013:2412) rather than to be actually sustainable. In order to 
be free from green pressures and be attractive to the environmental-conscious consumers, the 
number of companies engaging in greenwashing continues to grow nowadays (Horiuchi and 
Schuchard 2009; Delmas and Burbano 2011). 
                                            
4 It must be clarified that this argument is for the modern cities under capitalist logic of accumulation. Admittedly, it is true 
that a radical change in value systems in the capitalist societies e.g., abandonment of consumption-centric urban culture and 
of nature-urban dualism can make cities truly sustainable (Blassingame 1998; Martino 2009). However, from the true 
sustainability perspective (see page 20), capitalist cities are not sustainable, at least, at a theoretical level. 
5 “Sustainable city – at least as we presently defines cities – is an oxymoron” (Rees 1997:307). 
6 “If the “myth” of urban sustainability is founded on the “myth” of technological solutions, it is incumbent on us to 
approach the global flows underlying modern technologies from the perspective of social theory” (Hornborg 2014:3). 
7 “Sustainable development is an oxymoron” (Latouche 2010:64 and 2013:61). 
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Similarly, today’s proliferation of sustainable capitalist urban projects can be interpreted that 
real estate developers employ greenwashing strategy in order to avoid or mitigate green 
pressures, and increase attractiveness and competitiveness of their project by reaching at 
green demands. Applying greenwashing framework to capitalist urban projects will contribute 
to critically analyzing emerging sustainable urban projects and exposing capitalist logic of 
accumulation behind them. This is a significant step to build a solid foundation for discussing 
how to overcome the sustainable “capitalist” city or sustainable “capitalist” urban 
development oxymoron, and for imagining a true form of eco-harmonious human habitat. 
Nevertheless, theorization and empirical supports of urban greenwashing are, it seems, still in 
their infancy. Thus, this thesis tries to elaborate greenwashing framework of capitalist 
production of urban space and to empirically test the feasibility of the framework by applying 
it to the case study of Iskandar Malaysia, a typical sustainable capitalist urban project in 
Malaysia. Due to several constraints, this thesis focuses largely on new capitalist urban 
projects (production of urban space) and leaves a study on greenwashing and 
re-configurations of existing urban space for further research opportunities. 
 
Research questions: 
In order to elaborate urban greenwashing framework and its empirical supports, through 
theoretical and empirical analyses, this thesis tries to answer to two research questions: 
 
(1) Why and how can a capitalist urban green-field project be greenwashed? 
(2) Can urban greenwashing framework be supported by empirical observations in 
Iskandar Malaysia? 
Structure of the thesis: 
Part. I set up a theoretical foundation of empirical analyses. Relying on Henri Lefebvre’s 
Tateishi (2015) 
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arguments and David Harvey’s theory of spatio-temporal fix, this part first succinctly reviews 
the fundamental importance of production of urban space for capitalism to sustain capital 
accumulation, and discusses green pressures and demands that capitalist urban projects 
currently confront. Then, based upon a framework of greenwashing of consumer goods, this 
part discusses applicability of greenwashing to capitalist production of urban space in order 
for it to deal with green pressures and demands to ensure further capital accumulation. Finally, 
a framework of urban greenwashing for empirical analyses shall be synthesized, and two 
major relations shall be suggested by the framework, namely (1) environmental destruction 
level and promised greenness; and (2) price level and promised greenness. 
Part. II comprises two major chapters. The first chapter ‘Methodology’ explains the research 
area, methods, and variables for the empirical study. This part first explains overview and 
background of the Iskandar Malaysia project, and briefly discusses socio-environmental 
concerns associated with the project. Then, methods to operationalize, quantify, and detect 
two relations suggested by our framework constructed in the Part.I are explained. Then, target 
urban projects and target variables are specified including scoring criteria to quantify the 
promised greenness of each target project. After the data collection method of the 
operationalized variables has introduced, this part finally discusses limitations of the 
methodology. The second chapter ‘Outcomes and Discussions’ shows and discusses outcomes 
of the conducted empirical analyses. This chapter first succinctly explains the direction of the 
entire chapter, and shows a result of greenness evaluation of the target projects, then goes into 
two sections that correspond to two relations suggested by the framework. 
 
Part. III (Conclusions and Further Possibilities) concludes the entire analyses made by this 
thesis while thinking about the possibilities of the further research. 
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[Table 1] Examples of recent sustainable capitalist urban projects 
Note: Due to the great shift of demands for urban development from “developed” countries to 
Asian and middle-east countries last 20 years (Ōsawa 2015:337), all sustainable urban 
projects listed are planned in Asian-Middle-east countries. 
 
 
 
 
Name of Projct Place, Country Projected Term
Project Area
Size (square
kilometers) Green Concepts Source
Iskandar Malaysia Johor, Malaysia 2006 - 2025 2217.00*
...the green mega-city... a mega-city built along
eco-friendly lines, with green energy and an
end to the pollution…The plans are for a city
that not only incorporates the latest in
environmentally friendly technology, but that is
designed for social integration.
http://www.theguardian.com/envir
onment/2012/nov/02/iskandar-
malaysia-green-megacity
Dongtan Eco-City @ Chongming
Eco-Island
Dongtan, China 2005 - 2050 (Halted) 85.00
...a city with a 60 percent smaller ecological
footprint, 66 percent reduction in energy
demand, 40 percent energy use from bio-
energy, 100 percent renewable energy use for
buildings, on-site transportation, 83 percent
reduction of landfill waste, and almost no
carbon emissions...a compact city with low-rise
condominiums and high-tech, energy- saving
homes interspersed with green spaces...
http://www.designbuild-
network.com/projects/dongtan-
eco-city/
Chang and Sheppard (2013:62)
Tianjin Eco-City Tianjin, China 2009 - 2020 30.00
...based on the key components of an “eco
system’. Pragmatic and allegorical aspects of
ecology...Chinese eco-city, are selected as
themes Surrounded by greenery...are the
‘green’ and ‘urban’ ... The green spine acts as
both a recreational park-scape, green buffer as
well as an ecological corridor through which
flora and fauna can propagate and traverse
through the Eco-City...
http://openbuildings.com/building
s/tianjin-eco-city-profile-4292
Yuelai Eco-City Chongqing, China 2011 - ? 10.31
...special emphasis on sustainable
transportation, infrastructure and energy-
efficient uses. In fulfilling this vision... http://www.calthorpe.com/Yuelai
Masdar City Project Abu Dhabi, UAE 2006 - 2025 6.40
Masdar City, the first clean-technology cluster
to be located in a carbon-neutral, zero-waste
city…such high sustainability targets, the city
will be an innovator and pioneer in the
implementation of innovative sustainable
technologies for energy, water, and waste
management.
http://www.fosterandpartners.com
/projects/masdar-development/
http://www.careers.ch2m.com/wo
rldwide/en/engineering-
projects/masdar.asp
Incheon Songdo IBD Eco City Incheon, South Korea 2001 - 2015 6.07
ONE OF THE WORLDS GREENEST
CITIES..sustainable development will be key
quality-of-life attributes for both corporations
and residents...the first LEED (Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design) certified
district in Korea…
http://www.songdo.com/#
http://www.cityup.org/ae_ecocity/
Cases/Asia/20100118/58827.sht
ml
http://www.songdo.com/songdo-
international-business-district/the-
city/master-plan.aspx
Chengdu Tianfu District Great City Chengdu, China 2012 - 2020 1.30
...a self-sustaining, environmentally sensitive
1.3-square-kilometer satellite city...a
remarkable series of sustainable
benchmarks...48% less energy and 58% less
water than a conventional development of
similar population...produce 89% less landfill
waste and generate 60% less carbon dioxide.
http://smithgill.com/news/great_ci
ty_press_release/
Dubai Sustainable City Dubai, UAE 2013 - 2016 0.46
...consist of...he Institute for Ecological
Engineering, ...a “green” school, an eco-
resort...organic farms...and 600,000 square
feet of solar panels. Each house within the city
will be equipped with solar panels...a smart
water system that will reduce the water
demand of buildings by 30 percent...and there
will also be a waste recycling system and 20
organic farms.
http://www.diamond-
developers.ae/thesustainablecity/
index.html
http://inhabitat.com/dubais-
sustainable-city-will-be-powered-
by-600000-square-feet-of-solar-
cells/
Binhai Eco City Binha, China 2014 - ? 0.20
...as green oases powered by clean, renewable
energy...Binhai Eco City is designed to be an
example of how cities can be completely green
developments….The Eco City development
has planned green belt land to the north of the
site and aims to push the green land towards
the center of the site.
http://www.holmarchitectureoffice.
com/#
http://en.twwtn.com/Bignews/732
26.html?jdfwkey=i1wt5
Hangzhou Green City Hangzhou, China 2010 - ? ?
...lush green environment is tied to the likewise
green waterfront by means of two elevated
green passages...Our master planning scheme
for Site 3 of Hangzhou proposes a densely
populated area that is green, spacious,
pleasant and full of natural oxygen, produced
by the abundance of plants, bushes and trees.
http://www.onl.eu/?q=projects/ha
ngzhou-green-city
*Total development target area. Each Iskandar project has a
much smaller size of development.
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Part. I: Theoretical Arrangements 
 
1. Capitalist Production of Urban Space and Its Problems 
Throughout sections 1.1 – 1.3, this chapter shall succinctly show how fundamental production 
of urban space is for capitalism survival by relying on arguments of Lefebvre and Harvey. 
Then, this chapter shall show increasing green pressures and demands are a crucial issue for 
capitalism since it can disturb production of urban space that capitalism relying heavily on. 
Readers who are already familiar with Lefebvre and Harvey’s arguments can move directly to 
section 1.3. 
 
1.1. Commodification of Urban Space (Lefebvre) 
In many cities in many different societies, now and then, construction of buildings, of 
infrastructures, of factories, or construction 8  of urban space, have been an important 
component of making money. Historical records, for example, show that it is about 2000 
years ago, construction of urban space already become an important target of investment in 
the city of Roma. Roman financial brokers actively invested their money in projects to 
construct insulas, large-scale apartments, in order to generate profits (Ōsawa 2015:39). Urban 
spaces were valuable, thus profitable, because they were the foundation where people produce 
surplus values and re-produce themselves. Urban spaces were for production of goods and 
services, or it can be said that use value of space was the fountain of profits. However, after 
the advent of modern capitalism, its limitless transformative force of commodification made 
even space per se commoditized. Henri Lefebvre, a French Marxist urban scholar, first9 
proclaimed this that 
 
                                            
8 Here, I intentionally use ‘construction’ in order to differentiate ‘construction of urban space’ from ‘(Capitalist) production 
of urban space.’ Construction of urban space here means that to make spaces for (re-)production of goods, services, and 
ultimately human beings (based on use-value priority). On the other hand, production of urban space here means, as defined 
later on, that producing spaces as products (based on exchange-value priority). 
9 According to Hashimoto (2012:57). 
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city and urban reality are related to use value. Exchange value and the generalization of 
commodities by industrialization tend to destroy it by subordinating the city and urban 
reality which are refuges of use value, the origin of a virtual predominance and 
re-valorization of use (1968/1996:67-68). 
 
As this process of commodification progressed, the fundamental nature of urban spaces 
changed. Lefebvre claimed that 
 
space itself has begun to be bought and sold...Space is no longer only an indifferent 
medium, the sum of places where surplus value is created, realized, and distributed. It 
becomes the product of social labor, the very general object of production, and 
consequently of the formation of surplus value (1970/2003:154-155).  
 
Namely, urban spaces in the capitalist cosmology exist not only for production, but also as 
products, or it can be said that exchange value of space became an important aspect of capital 
formation. Thus, Capitalist production of urban space can be defined as producing urban 
spaces for exchange (within commodity markets). 
 
As modern capitalism became more complicated and larger-scale, it “found new aspiration in 
the conquest of space, in trivial terms, in real estate speculation, capital projects (inside and 
outside the city), the buying and selling of space. And it did so on a worldwide scale10” 
(Lefebvre 1970/2003:155). After surplus value realized from industrial sectors (the first 
circuit of capital formation) has started decreasing due to post-industrialization of the matured 
capitalist societies, capitalist production of urban space for speculation of real-estate (the 
second circuit of capital formation) is becoming ever more major driving force of further 
capital accumulation. As of 2011, the size of global real-estate market is estimated 
approximately Trillion US$ 26 while the total GDP of the countries studied for this estimation 
is Trillion US$ 65 (Fiorilla, Kapas, and Liang 2012). These figures show that how huge 
                                            
10 This spatial expansion of urban spaces shall be discussed in the next section. 
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today’s real-estate market is, and it is important to note here that the size of real-estate market 
is projected to continuously grow by 2030, especially in Asia-Pacific (see Figure 1 below). 
 
 
 
[Fig 1] Estimated size of global institutional-grade commercial real estate market in 
2011 
Note: Graphed by the author based on the source: Fiorilla, Manidipa, and Youguo (2012). 
Left bar chart is directly adapted from Fiorilla, Manidipa, and Youguo (2012:5). 
 
Nearly 40 years ago, Lefebvre argued that “real-estate speculation becomes the principal 
source for the formation of capital…” (Lefebvre 1970/2003:160), and it is still true today, or 
(as previous statistics implies) even becoming truer. It can be said by modifying Lefebvre’s 
words that today, for capitalism, the second circuit supplants the first, namely production of 
urban space, is one of the essential components for formation of capital11. 
 
1.2. Spatio-Temporal Fixes (Harvey) 
As it has been shown, capitalist production of urban space (or it can be said commodification 
                                            
11 His original phrase is “[t]he second circuit supplants the first, becomes essential (Lefebvre 1970/2003:160).” 
????????????
*Graph was absorbed from “A Bird’s Eye 
View of Global Real Estate Markets: 
2012 Update FEBRUARY 2012” Page.5
Trillion US$
Source: “A Bird’s Eye View of 
Global Real Estate Markets: 2012 
Update FEBRUARY 2012”
Total Market Size = Trillion US$ 26.6
Total GDP of Studied Countries = Trillion US$ 65.0
*Global GDP Trillion US$ 71 in 2011
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of urban space) is an essential part of capital accumulation today. However, Lefebvre’s 
arguments do not explicitly discuss what kind of role production of urban space can play in a 
crisis phase of over-accumulation of capital. In addition, only Lefebvre’s arguments are not 
enough to understand a (driving force of) global-scale spatial expansion of capitalist urban 
spaces. In order to elaborate these points, this section takes a cursory look at David Harvey’s 
theory of spatio-temporal fixes. 
 
Based on Karl Marx’s arguments in Das Kapital volume 2 and 312, David Harvey formulated 
that individual capitalists, as long as they remain as a capitalist, under the harsh 
intra-capitalist competition, must continue to gain profits higher than initial investments, or to 
accumulate more capital, by increasing both absolute surplus value and relative surplus 
value 13  (Marx 1867/1976; Harvey 1981). This process occurs, in modern capitalism, 
especially as a form of an increase of productivity by technological adjustments and 
innovations. The final outcome of this endless process14 is, Harvey argues, 
 
a condition of over-accumulation of capital, defined as an excess of capital in relation 
to the opportunities to employ that capital profitably. This excess of capital can exist as 
a surplus of commodities, of money, of productive capacity, and also leads to a surplus 
of labor power, (widespread unemployment or underemployment) (Harvey 1981:7). 
 
This is a crisis phase of over-accumulation of capital. Under such crises, individual capitalists 
will be no longer available to utilize surplus capital so that it will be profitable (no further 
demand for too-much products, no lucrative target of investments, and thus, no further needs 
                                            
12 Marx wrote, for instance, that a “capitalist has two objectives: in the first place, he wants to produce a use-value which has 
exchange-value, i.e. an article destined to be sold, a commodity; and secondly he wants to produce a commodity greater in 
value than the sum of the values of the commodities used to produce it, namely the means of production and the labor-power 
he purchased with his good money on the open market. His aim is to produce not only a use-value, but a commodity; not only 
use-value, but value; and not just value, but also surplus-value (Marx 1867/1976:293).” 
13 According to Marx, absolute surplus value will be generated by the prolongation of the working day while relative surplus 
value will be generated by the reduction of the necessary labor through techno-social innovations (1976:645). 
14 In reality, this is not likely an endless process. Ecological (not environmental) economic tells us that this process is only 
able to be endless unless negative side effects associated with the process (e.g., global warming, environmental destructions, 
and dissipation of exergy) have reached at the limit of planetary ecological capacity of absorbing such negative effects. See 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1974) and Harman Daly (1991) for instance. 
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to operate over-productive factories and employees), and they will end up as the devaluation 
of capital 
 
as money (through inflation), as commodities (through gluts on the market and falling 
prices), as productive capacity (through idle or under-utilized plant and equipment, 
physical infrastructures, etc., culminating in bankruptcy), and the devaluation of labor 
power (through falling real standards of living of the laborer) (Harvey 1981:7). 
 
It is definitely imperative for capitalist to avoid, or at least mitigate, such devaluation of 
capital, or economic depression, in order to save their capital and sustain capital formation. 
We can observe here an internal contradiction of capitalism, that is, the will to further 
accumulation and its actual outcomes –over-accumulation–, will make an inevitable obstacle 
to further growth. However, Harvey argues that capitalism is able to (temporarily) fix such 
crises of devaluation by (a) spatially; (b) temporally absorbing over-accumulated capital; and 
by sometimes combining (a) and (b) (Harvey2003:109). 
 
(a) Harvey first formulated a spatial fix (fixing the over-accumulated capital problem by 
geographical expansions or re-configurations). Harvey assumes four basic spatial strategies 
that capitalists can take for a spatial fix, namely; (1) to develop new external markets and 
export commodity capitals to there; (2) to export production capital to new markets; (3) to 
develop new proletariat labor markets and to exploit them with low wages; and (4) to impose 
economic (devaluation) risks to other rival economies through international power games, 
sometime through wars (Harvey 2006:432-438; Jessop 2006:149; Belina 2011:79). (1) to (3) 
shall be explained more in the following paragraphs since they are relevant to urban 
expansions and re-configurations. 
 
(1) and (2) are relatively straightforward. If a capitalist has too much products and/or 
too-much money for investments, and if this capitalist cannot find places within his/her 
Tateishi (2015) 
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country where s/he can profitably sale and/or invest, then s/he can, possibly together with 
other capitalists, develop new profitable markets abroad. This process entails new expansions 
and/or re-configurations of cities, as a market center, and of other built environments (such as 
ports, airports, and railways). 
 
As for (3), Harvey talked about making new wage labors (as well as wealth and land) through 
the process of primitive accumulation (e.g., enclosure; colonization). Although forms of 
primitive accumulation appear less obvious today, accumulation by dispossession is still 
spreading geographically and intensifying in the name of economic growth, associated with 
related processes of financialization, privatization, marketization, gentrification, and the like. 
Through such processes of accumulation, many people are dispossessed of their wealth and 
land, and imposed to work for capitalist companies as low-wage labor. It is also important to 
note that in order to organize, educate, and re-produce such an increasing number of cheap 
wage labors, as Manuel Castells demonstrated, expansions and re-configurations of collective 
consumption goods (such as infrastructures, cheap apartments, schools, hospitals, and etc.), 
namely cities, are inevitable (Castells 1977:234-242; Hashimoto 2012:51-52). 
 
(b) Harvey then formulated a temporal fix, that is, to fix the over-accumulated capital 
problems by “temporal displacement through investment in long-term capital projects15 or 
social expenditures (such as education and research)16 that defer the re-entry of capital values 
into circulation into the future” (2003:109). By combining spatial fixes, temporal fixes 
become particularly important when formation of urban built environments is analyzed. 
(a)+(b): A spatio-temporal fix, that is to absorb and spatially-fix17 surplus capital within built 
                                            
15 This is same as “the second circuit of capital formation,” which we have discussed in the Lefebvre section. Harvey calls 
this as a “secondary circuit of fixed capital and consumption fund formation (Harvey 2003:109).”  
16 Harvey calls this as a “tertiary circuit of social expenditures and research and development (Harvey 2003:109).” 
17 As Harvey himself points out that the term “'fix' has a double meaning” in his argument (2003:115), ‘fix’ is used as ‘to 
resolve’ of the over-accumulation problem as well as ‘to pin’ surplus capital on a particular geographical location (especially 
on built environments). 
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environments, and increase future return on investment. Although, in a theoretical sense, 
spatial fixes and temporal fixes can be studied separately, Harvey points out that strategies of 
spatial fixes basically cannot be 
 
divorced from temporal shifts in which surplus capital gets displaced into long-term 
projects that take many years to return their value to circulation through the productive 
activity they support (2003:88)…[built environments] can and do absorb massive 
amounts of capital and labor, particularly…under conditions of geographical expansion 
(2003:111 [ ] inserted). 
 
Expansions and re-configurations of urban built environments (such as factories, railways, 
highways, airports, water and sewer services, apartments, skyscrapers) will require not only a 
huge amount of commodity and productive capital for its own physical expansions and 
re-organization but also a considerable volume of surplus financial capital (investments)18. 
Such financial investments “can be productive in the long run if they contribute to the future 
productivity of capital” as forms of, for instance, “a more efficient transport and 
communications system eases the path to further capital accumulation” (Harvey 2003:111) or 
of a luxury condominium or office complex whose exchange value is expected to be higher 
than initial investments (c.f., Lefebvre’s arguments). 
 
As the discussion so far has briefly shown, crises of over-accumulation, which are a very 
structural tendency of capitalism, must be fixed in order for capitalists to survive. Spatial 
fixes (geographical expansions and re-configurations of urban built environments) and 
temporal fixes (deferment of realization of investments through built environment projects) 
are an indispensable mechanism for capitalism to avoid or mitigate these crises. 
 
                                            
18 Harvey also elaborated that, in order for surplus financial capital to be utilized for long-term urban projects, or spatial fix 
strategies, development of financial institutions and governmental supports are necessary. To make the discussion simple, in 
this thesis I will not go into further explanation about this topic. 
Tateishi (2015) 
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1.3. Urban eco-climatic issues and sustainable cities as a response 
As shown in the previous sections, urban expansions (production of urban space) and 
re-configurations (re-production of urban space) are an indispensable mechanism of today’s 
capitalism (in terms both of further accumulation and survival). However, it is (at least up to 
now) impossible for capitalist cities and their (re)production to progress without causing 
eco-climatic (as well as socio-economic) challenges. Amongst such challenges, increases of 
vegetation loss and of CO2 emissions due to rapid urban expansions are one of the issues to be 
urgently addressed. 
 
United Nations (2014) predicts that the share of global urban population will increase from 
50 % today to approximately 70 % in 2050. Alongside with this rapid conversion of human 
population into urban dwellers, urban areas are expected to grow rapidly. Seto, Güneralp, and 
Hutyra estimated (2012) that, by 2030, approximately 1.2 million km2 of lands, which is 
almost equal to the Republic of South Africa, would be directly converted to urban built-up 
areas. Such rapid urbanization indirectly destroys vegetation as well. DeFries et al conducted 
an empirical study across 41 countries within the tropical region, and found that “forest loss is 
positively correlated with urban population growth and exports of agricultural products” 
during 2000 and 2005 (2010:178). They concluded that both urban and international demands 
for food products are important drivers of deforestation of the region. It is no doubt that such 
worldwide conversion of lands continues to directly and indirectly destroy vegetation and 
ecosystems, decrease biodiversity, and reduce CO2 absorption capacity of the planet. 
 
In addition, cities19 consume a considerable amount of energy in order to light, heat, cool, 
communicate, transport, and feed the dwellers inside them. For example, in 2014, building 
and transportation sectors in the USA consumed nearly 70 % of the total primary energy 
                                            
19 “Urban lifestyle” could be a more appropriate subject though. 
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consumption of the country (Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 2014). As 
Figure 2.1 and 2.2 below show, transportation and building operation are responsible for 
approximately 60 % of energy consumption worldwide in 2012. It is important to note that 
because both commercial and residential buildings generally last 50-100 years, they 
continuously require energy and emit CO2 during such a long period of time (The American 
Institute of Architects 2015) unless they will be perfectly free from fossil fuel consumption. 
This massive consumption of energy makes cities a primary contributor to global warming. 
UN-Habitat estimates that, as of 2011, emissions of anthropogenic green house gas “resulting 
from cities using production-based figures could be between 40–70 per cent of the total, while 
a consumption-based calculation suggests levels as high as 60–70 per cent” (2011:16). 
 
 
 
[Fig 2.1: Left panel] Absolute final energy consumption by sector in 2012 
[Fig 2.2: Right panel] Final energy consumption share by sector in 2012  
Note: These graphs were made by the author based on the information provide by 
International Energy Agency’s Sankey Diagram20. 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that as global eco-climatic issues are attracting ever more attentions, 
capitalist cities and their production began to be exposed to a wide range of pressures and 
                                            
20 http://www.iea.org/Sankey/ 
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demands to be eco-friendly, sustainable, low-carbon, or simply green. As I have discussed in 
sections 1.1 and 1.2, production of urban space is a crucial component for capitalism. These 
mean that it is inevitable for capitalists to reconcile such critiques and demands to be 
sustainable with production of urban space (means further economic growth). 
 
A possible and straightforward path for capitalists is to produce capitalist cities so that they 
will attain both sustainability and economic growth, namely to make sustainable ‘capitalist’ 
cities. According to discourses around influential international institutions and firms, such 
sustainable cities can be achieved by introducing innovative planning and technologies that 
are eco-friendly and low-carbon (New York City 2006; Sioufi 2010; UN-Habitat 2011; 
Sustainable Development Solutions Network 2013; Davies 2013:114, United Nations 2014; 
Arup 2015). Alf Hornborg, who critically analyzes a relation between sustainability and 
modern industrial technology, also points out that 
 
[s]eemingly more realistic and less totalitarian, the predominant recipe for urban 
sustainability today is to develop and apply new technologies (such as recycling and 
renewable energy) in order to alleviate the pressures of urban growth on the biosphere 
and rural people engaged in provisioning urban populations. It is no doubt safe to say 
that mainstream modern discourse on urban sustainability is founded almost 
exclusively on the last [techno-fixes] of these three options (Hornborg 2014:2, [] 
added). 
 
In tandem with discourses like “cities are a solution to eco-climatic issues” (c.f., Davis 2010; 
Rosenzweig et al 2010; El-Sioufi 2010; UN-Habitat 2011), the sustainable city discourse 
seems to be welcomed (by capitalists) and to be more and more incorporated into the basic 
concept of architectural and urban projects as Table 1 in the introduction shows. 
 
1.4. Sustainable cities as techno-fix feasible? 
However, the feasibility of such sustainable cities relying heavily on techno-fixes is quite 
Tateishi (2015) 
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contested. It seems to me that there are four major reasons why this is contested, namely (1) a 
possibility of the Jevons paradox, (2) socio-politico nature of modern technology, (3) unequal 
availability of cutting-edge technology, and (4) a fundamental conflict between true 
sustainability and the capitalist logic of accumulation. 
 
(1) John Bellamy Foster discusses the Jevons paradox in relation to techno-fixes of 
eco-climatic issues in his book Ecology Against Capitalism (2002). According to Foster, 
William Stanley Jevons, a British economist, wrote about an intriguing paradox in his The 
Coal Question (1865) that Jevons found “increased efficiency in using a natural resource, 
such as coal, only resulted in increased demand for that resource, not a reduction in demand” 
(2002:94). An increased energy efficiency of a technology entails more demands for that 
technology rather than less demands – this is the Jevons paradox. Foster argues that the 
paradox can be observed today such as energy-efficient cars increased demands for them; 
technological improvements in refrigerators increased a demand for them, and he concludes 
that such tendencies “are in effect within industry, independent of individual consumption” 
(2002:95). The same can be said for the techno-fixed sustainable cities. Without an 
appropriate socio-political measurements, an increased energy efficiency of urban 
transportation (including automobiles) systems and built environments will make the costs for 
utilizing them lower, and will end up increasing demands for them. Such increasing demands 
may offset the reduced energy consumption by the technological improvements in sustainable 
urban development. 
  
(2) Alf Hornborg constructed an elaborate politico-ecological theory on modern industrial 
technology. He emphasizes that modern industrial technology is not a mere combination of 
things and knowledge. Rather, he points out an importance to “understand machines as 
thoroughly social phenomena. They are the result of asymmetric, global transfers of resource” 
Tateishi (2015) 
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(2001:11). His understanding of the modern technology denies a common belief that modern 
industrial technology itself is immune to socio-politico arguments; on the contrary, it implies 
that modern industrial technology per se is a very building block of the global political 
structure. By Lasswell’s definition (1958), kernel questions of ‘politics’ are “who gets what, 
when, how,” and “where” can be added to these. Therefore, modern industrial technology can 
be thought of as a part of a global mechanism of deciding who gets what, when, how, and 
where. According to the arguments by Hornborg, modern industrial technology exists as an 
unequal and unfair answer to these political questions. He argues “[t]he rational of industrial 
technology is to save time and space, but a global analysis reveals the extent to which this is 
achieved at the expense of human time and natural space elsewhere in the world system” 
(2013:20 emphasis added). Based upon these careful theoretical arguments, he questions 
techno-fixes as a silver bullet to social-ecological issues because “every ‘technological’ 
solution is ultimately a social relation in the sense that it will have implications for the 
societal distribution of the burden of problem-solving” (2013:38 emphasis added) and it is “a 
strategy for capacitating an affluent minority of the world’s population through an 
asymmetrical exchange—an expanding net appropriation—of resource from the rest of the 
world” (2013:35 emphasis added). Hornborg’s politico-ecological analysis on technology can 
be applied to sustainable capitalist cities relying on techno-fixes. A capitalist city may be 
“sustainable” at a local level, but it will not be so at the global level because urban 
techno-fixes (or urban innovations) are highly likely a mere re-combination of how and where 
a city gets energy and resources and how and where the city imposes its burdens on. This 
socio-politico aspect of urban techno-fixes becomes more important when we think of who 
(or which city) is available to utilize such a techno-fix strategy. 
 
(3) An important problem of urban techno-fixes is that not all cities can afford to utilize such 
cutting-edge technologies because of their high costs (for innovation as well as for actual 
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installation). There is a possibility that ‘techno-fixed’ sustainable capitalist cities, or 
borrowing Mike Davis’ pertinent notion (2010) Noah’s Ark, will be a climate shelter 
exclusively for an affluent minority. Richard Florida, an urban economic geographer, argues 
that world cities are being divided into economically successful and not so, and shaping a 
“spiky” inter-urban economic geography, instead of a simplified geographic understanding 
such as “the end of geography (e.g., Friedman 2006)” (2005; 2008; 2010; 2014). Enrico 
Moretti, an urban economist, also points out a geographical inequality, particularly 
inter-urban economic differences (2012). It can be safely argued that such a spiky urban 
geography of the economic affluence will affect to what extent a city will be able to develop 
and utilize expensive and cutting-edge urban techno-fixes. Some studies have already 
suggested that risks of climate change and the capacity to cope with them are 
socio-economically and geographically different from city to city (Hadson and Marvin 2009; 
Hadson and Marvin 2010; UN-Habitat 2011; Hallegatte et al 2013; Revi et al 2014). 
UN-Habitat additionally points out that ability to handle eco-climatic issues will be unequal 
even within a city due to socio-economic segregation by city-district level (2011). 
 
(4) Intriguingly, these three points do not violate the logic of capitalist accumulation. Urban 
techno-fixes will generate more demands for certain energy and products and continue to 
make benefits for few affluent people while reconfiguring the global flows of exergy into and 
entropy from rich cities. This is not surprising because the idea of sustainable ‘capitalist’ 
cities developed as reconciliation between economic growth and sustainability. As I have 
already discussed, today’s capitalist cities and their (re)production are ruled mostly under the 
capitalist logic of accumulation so that they can continue to drive and ensure further capital 
accumulation. Urban sustainability by techno-fixes only works unless it will not contradict the 
fundamental logic of capital accumulation. However, if we really would like to achieve a 
“true” sustainable city, it must require decreasing (or at least steady) demands for energy and 
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resources, and its urban metabolism must have a win-win (or fair) metabolic relationship with 
its hinterlands, and its eco-climatic benefits must be for all people, the poor as well as the rich. 
This true sustainable (or it could be substituted by the word strong sustainable21) city 
contradicts the capitalist logic of accumulation. Thus, in a way similar to some scholars’ 
arguments (e.g., Rees 1997:307; Hornborg 2014; Latouche 2004/2010:64 and 2010/2013:61), 
the notions of sustainable “capitalist” city and sustainable “capitalist” urban development can 
be thought of as an oxymoron or a myth. In other word, as long as urban techno-fixes work 
only within the capitalist logic of accumulation, they will not be a true remedy for 
eco-climatic challenges. 
 
2. Greenwashing Theory 
2.1. Greenwashing overview and its framework 
The previous discussions revealed that sustainable capitalist cities and production of them that 
rely heavily on techno-fixes, as long as they work under the capitalist logic of accumulation, 
hardly to be truly “sustainable” both from practical and theoretical perspectives. Then, in 
what way should today’s increasing number of sustainable urban projects (c.f., Table 1 in the 
introduction) be interpreted? If, as I have discussed, sustainable ‘capitalist’ urban projects are, 
at a level of their underlying logic, rarely to be actually green, how are they working for an 
increasing number of pressures and demands to be eco-friendly, sustainable, low-carbon, or 
green? A possible answer to these questions is to think of sustainable capitalist urban projects 
as simply greenwashing: pretending (fundamentally) not-green as green in order to attain 
economic benefits by reaching at green demands while securing themselves from green 
critiques. 
 
                                            
21 The weak sustainability perspective (or paradigm) postulates that “man-made capital is more important than natural capital” 
(Davis 2013:111). On the other hand, the strong sustainability perspective (or paradigm) postulates that there is no natural 
capital that can be substituted by man-made capital (e.g., a technology emulating an ecological function). For further details, 
see (Davis 2013). 
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According to Delmas and Burbano (2011), greenwashing is “the act of misleading consumers 
regarding the environmental practices of a company (firm-level greenwashing) or the 
environmental benefits of a product or service (product-level greenwashing).” As the rise of 
eco-climatic consciousness within capitalist societies, green marketing both of products and 
companies is becoming ever more crucial for corporations to attract green demands as well as 
showing their commitment to corporate social responsibility for sustainability (Chang 2011; 
Delmas and Burbano 2011; Chen and Chang 2013; Nyilasy, Gangadharbatla, and Paladino 
2014). The number of green advertisements has grown nearly tenfold in the last 20 years, and 
it has approximately tripled since 2006 (Delmas and Burbano 2011:64). However, “being 
green” and/or “to be green” is not an easy task for many companies due to huge costs and 
necessary efforts to be so. In addition, it must be noted here that, as I have discussed 
previously, the logic of true sustainability theoretically contradicts the capitalist logic of 
accumulation that rules over the entire production of consumer goods. Thus, from the true 
sustainability perspective (c.f., Davies 2013), “capitalist” producers and consumers will never 
be truly sustainable. By facing such difficulty of achieving real greenness, many companies 
have fallen for the seduction of greenwashing “to selectively reveal the positive information 
about the environmental features of their products without disclosing negative information in 
order to generate green image” (Chen, Lin, and Chang 2013:2412) rather than to be truly 
sustainable. To make matters worse, the number of companies engaging in greenwashing 
continues to grow and even skyrocket nowadays (Horiuchi and Schuchard 2009; Delmas and 
Burbano 2011). For instance, according to TerraChoice, a research organization for 
greenwashing22, judged by its 2008/2009 survey that more than 95 % of consumer goods 
committed at least one of the “Seven Sins of Greenwashing”23 (Delmas and Burbano 2011). 
                                            
22 TerraChoice was acquired by UL, a premier safety science firm, and resources provided by the organization is no longer 
available online. 
23 The “Seven Sins of Greenwashing” are 7 criteria made by UL (former TerraChoice) in order to detect greenwashing 
product. According to UL, the Seven Sins of Greenwashing consist of sin of (1) the hidden trade-off, of (2) no proof, of (3) 
vagueness, of (4) worshiping false labels, of (5) irrelevance, of (6) lesser of two evils, and of (7) fibbing. For more detail, see 
http://sinsofgreenwashing.com/findings/the-seven-sins/ 
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Then, more specifically why do a growing number of firms (intentionally or unintentionally) 
commit greenwashing? What kind of drivers can thrust a company to employ greenwashing 
strategy? A concise study by Delmas and Burbano (2011) gives us a solid framework of 
greenwashing drivers. According to them, greenwashing and its drivers can be categorized 
into four different levels: (i) non-market external drivers, (ii) market external drivers, (iii) 
organizational (or company) drivers, and (iv) individual (within a company) drivers (see 
Figure 3 below). Note here that, their study focuses only on “poor environmental performers” 
(Ibid:67), thus they treat “firm environmental performance as fixed and focus on firm 
communication about environmental performance” (Ibid:68). Let us succinctly review 
Delmas and Burbano’s greenwashing framework and drivers: 
 
 
[Fig 3] Framework of greenwashing and greenwashing drivers at different levels 
(iii) Organizational Drivers
(iv) Individual Drivers
Greenwashing
(ii) Market External Drivers
Consumer 
Demand 
Investor 
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Incentive Structure 
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Regulatory 
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Activists, 
NGOs, Media 
Monitoring 
Adapted from Delmas & Burbano (Figure.1 in 2011:67) and modified by the author (2015)
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(i) Non-market external drivers: 
As we can imagine, regulations and regulators related to greenwashing both at national and 
international levels are a critical factor for firms to decide whether or not they will commit 
greenwashing. Current lax and uncertain regulatory context allows firms to be easily seduced 
by greenwashing (Ibid:69-70). In such a context, activist groups, NGOs, and media “currently 
play a critical role as informal monitors of firm greenwashing” (Ibid:70). As environmental 
consciousness has been rising within the capitalist societies, such groups are getting ever 
more influential to impose companies to stop greenwashing. Nevertheless, due to the lax and 
uncertain regulatory context of greenwashing, these groups can “only bring about reputational 
damage to greenwashing firms” (Ibid:71). At this level, Demas and Burbano talk about the 
regulatory context for greenwashing not for poor environmental performance as a whole. 
However, it is no doubt that these factors, especially informal monitoring groups, also form 
pressures on companies to be sustainable in tandem with market external factors. 
 
(ii) Market external drivers: 
Delmas and Burbano point out that market external factors are “critical to understanding why 
some environmentally low-performing firms choose to greenwash” (Ibid:71). In the age of 
rising eco-climatic consciousness, poor-environmental performers always confront various 
forms of pressures and demands “from both consumers and investors to appear to be 
environmentally friendly and thus face incentives to communicate positively about their 
environmental performance” (Ibid:71-72). In addition to this, I would like to point out that 
poor-environmental performers also face lucrative demands on “really” green products from 
the environmental conscious consumers. Delmas and Burbano point out that the competitive 
landscape of a market is also important. Capitalist companies, as Marx first mentioned, are 
always exposed to the harsh competition in the market, thus it is inevitable for them to 
continuously catch up a successful business practices of their competitors in order to not 
Tateishi (2015) 
 24 
being left behind, and “research has shown that this applies to the adoption of green practices” 
(Ibid:72). As “being green” becomes a more crucial factor for the market competition, 
companies, regardless whether they are good or poor environmental performers, must appear 
to be green in order to keep their competitiveness within the fierce market. 
 
(iii) Organizational (or company) drivers: 
Firm characteristics, incentive structure and ethical climate, effectiveness of intra-firm 
communication, and organizational inertia are important factors for companies to form their 
response to external drivers: 
 
-Firm Characteristics: 
All companies are different in their size, belonging industry, profitability, product lifecycle, 
core competencies, and etc. Such characteristics, according to Delmas and Burbano, 
undoubtedly affect the strategy mix of a firm (Ibid:73). As I have touched previously, the 
latent benefits to greenwashing companies include more accessibility to green-conscious 
consumers and investors, and such latent benefits will also be changed by basic firm 
characteristics (Ibid:73). In addition, the intensity of green pressures can vary as well because 
of company attributes. Delmas and Burbano point out that consumer products companies 
likely confront consumer pressures (and demands) that are much stronger than those for 
service or non-consumer products companies (ibid:73). Similarly, people (as well as NGOs 
and media) tend to pay attention to environmental practice of large and famous corporations, 
and thus these corporations also “likely face greater levels of investor pressure than smaller, 
private firms” (Ibid:73). Particularly, companies belonging to “dirty” or “not-green” 
industries, such as energy and utilities, are more likely to be “targeted by activists and NGOs” 
(Ibid:73). It can be said that real estate developers operating large-scale green-field projects 
also belong as belonging to such “dirty” or “not-green” industries, and thus likely confront 
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intensive green pressures (Parsa and Farshchi 1996). 
 
-Incentive Structure and Ethical Climate: 
If a company has a climate or an incentive structure that allows employees to conduct 
unethical behavior, that is, “a harmful effect on others and is either illegal or morally 
unacceptable in the larger community” (Ibid:73), such a company tends to commit 
greenwashing. We can think of greenwashing as an example of such ‘unethical behavior’ 
(Ibid:74). Thus, when the company does not have a climate or an incentive structure to 
prevent the company (individual employees) from conducting unethical behavior, the 
company likely does not prevent itself from committing greenwashing. 
 
-Organizational Inertia: 
Large organizations having a long history tend to persist in their traditions, successful models, 
and way of thinking. Such organizational inertia prevents a firm from improving, or even 
discarding, the firm’s “business-as-usual” (which often must be changed in order to be more 
sustainable).  
 
-Effectiveness of Intra-firm Communication: 
It is not easy for you to fully understand what your coworkers are working for as well as what 
your company’s products exactly are, particularly if your company hires more than, say, 
20,000 employees. Ineffective intra-firm communication and knowledge management 
systems can make misunderstandings about a product between different workers as well as 
departments. For example, due to the inefficient intra-firm communication in your company, 
marketing people misunderstood (overestimated) the greenness of a product even though 
people in actual design and production processes correctly understand its real green 
performance. This misunderstanding of the product by the marketing people will lead the 
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company to unintentional greenwashing. 
 
(iv) Individual (within a company) drivers: 
Because an organization is a gathering of individuals, individual-level psychological and 
cognitive factors affect “decision-making processes and thus influence how external drivers 
translate into motivation for action” (Ibid:76). Delmas and Burbano’s framework deals with 
four such individual factors: narrow decision framing (the tendency to decide something 
within limited information and assumptions), hyperbolic inter-temporal discounting (the 
tendency that people are impatient over short horizons and patient over long horizons. In 
other words, people cannot wait for eating a fruit in the front of them even though they can 
wait for growing a fruit), and optimistic bias (the tendency that people unreasonably think of 
a thing as better (not worse) than the reality). According to Delmas and Burbano, these four 
individual factors can create an individual inclination for committing greenwashing. 
 
Simplifying the framework 
Delmas and Burbano’s greenwashing framework is, as I have reviewed, developed and 
structured quite well, however, let us in this thesis ignore a large part of (i) non-market 
external drivers except for their green pressures and (iv) all individual drivers. This is because 
(i’) to discuss the regulatory context of greenwashing as well as greening per se requires 
extensive analyses on policy making and legislative systems, and this is out of scope of this 
thesis; and (iv’) to discuss individual-level factors requires solid knowledge about psychology, 
cognitive science, and organizational behavior, which is also out of scope of this thesis. Then, 
let us simplify Delmas and Burbano’s framework into a demand side (consumers and 
investors),a supply side (real estate developers, investors, governmental institutions, other 
beneficiaries, and a nexus of them), and a regulation side (regulators, activists, NGOs, media, 
and non-beneficiary stakeholders). As Delmas and Burbano’s framework states, there are 
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green pressures on the supply side both from the demand and regulation sides. In addition, 
there are green demands from the demand side, which the supply side is eager to reach at. In 
order to response both to green pressures and demands, the supply side tends to be compelled 
to make green efforts; however, as we have seen, various drivers, particularly organizational 
drivers of the supply side, lead the supply side not to actually making green efforts but to 
greenwashing. In sum, (poor environmental performance) companies take greenwashing 
strategy in order to avoid or mitigate green pressures (from the regulation and demand sides), 
at the same time, to reach at green demands (from the demand side) in order to reap profits. 
 
2.2. Different patterns of urban greenwashing? 
Likewise, today’s proliferation of sustainable capitalist urban projects relying on techno-fixes 
(based upon the myth of reconciliation between economic growth and sustainability) can be 
interpreted that the supply side (a nexus of real estate developers, investors, governmental 
institutions, and other beneficiaries), intentionally or unintentionally, employs greenwashing 
strategy in order to (function 1) avoid or mitigate green pressure both from the regulation and 
demand sides by pretending its projects as sustainable, and at the same time to (function 2) 
keep or increase attractiveness and market-competitiveness, and thus to keep or increase an 
exchange value, of its projects by reaching at green demands from the demand side. However, 
admittedly, it is fair to point out that to think of all sustainable capitalist urban projects as 
greenwashing is oversimplification and even an unfair evaluation for some sincere urban 
green efforts. I agree with such a rebuttal, and thus see a need to theoretically elaborate such 
points before we are moving to further discussions on these two functionalities. Let us take a 
closer look at Table 2 below. 
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[Table 2] Possible evaluation of ‘promised’ greenness observed in marketing strategy 
 
 
Table 2 shows possible evaluation about greenness promised by green marketing (‘promised’ 
greenness) of different types of capitalist urban projects. First, let us sort capitalist urban 
projects into (a) production of urban space (completely new developments in the non-urban 
lands) and (b) re-production of urban space (any kind of up-grade, revitalization, or 
re-development of the existing urban built environments). Note that, even though the target of 
analysis of this thesis is only production of urban space, I would like to discuss re-production 
of urban space here as well in order to be theoretically precise. Then, regarding both (a) and 
(b), let us sort them into (g) projects with green marketing and (ng) projects with no green 
marketing. At this step, “capitalist production and re-production of urban space with (ng) no 
green marketing” are ignored by our theoretical discussion since they are, without green 
marketing efforts, not greenwashing at all regardless whether or not they, in reality, try to be 
sustainable. Next, let us sort the remaining “green” urban projects (a,g and b,g) into (+) projects 
with real green efforts (techno-fixes) and (0) no real green efforts. At this stage, by definition, 
projects with (0) no real green efforts (namely, a,g,0 and b,g,0) are judged as greenwashing. 
(+) Real efforts
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Tateishi (2015) 
 29 
Difficult cases are the green development with real efforts (a,g,+) and the green 
re-development with real efforts (b,g,+). From the capitalist logic perspective (which is 
similar to the weak sustainability point of view in terms of its positive attitude to the 
feasibility of techno-fixes), both (a,g,+) and (b,g,+) could be really, or relative to other old 
built environments, sustainable by innovative techno-fixes. However, if we would like to 
evaluate (a,g,+) and (b,g,+) from the true sustainably point of view, both types of projects will 
be theoretically judged as greenwashing. As for (a,g,+) projects, this is because (1) a new 
(green-field) urban project, by definition, is inevitable to convert non-urban lands (e.g., 
forests, grasslands, farms, croplands etc.) into urban built environments, which entails 
destruction of environments and ecosystems; (2) as I have discusses, it is doubtful that 
techno-fixes and new configuration(s), which associated with the such techno-fixes, of 
metabolic flows are truly sustainable and ecologically-just at the global level; and (3) 
capitalist production of new urban space means a spatial encroachment of the global capitalist 
logic of accumulation (based upon exchange value, unlimited production and consumption, 
and systemic24 socio-economic inequality) on the vernacular sustainable logic (based upon 
use value, steady-sustainable production and consumption, and historical-cultural differences). 
As for (b,g,+) projects, they are greenwashing from the true sustainability perspective because 
of reason (2). However, note that, unlike (a,g,+) projects, (b,g,+) projects can retain a 
theoretical possibility to be sustainable even from the true sustainability perspective because 
of their less (or minimum) destruction of environments; nevertheless, reason (2) seems 
sufficient to prevent (b,g,+) projects from achieving true urban sustainability. 
 
From now on, let us focus again on production of urban space, as our initial direction. More 
elaborated theoretical and empirical analyses on the relationship between urban greenwashing 
                                            
24 As for this point, Baudrillard elaborately discusses that growth based on Capitalism is very function of inequality. “At best, 
we can say the system stabilizes around a certain rate of distortion, or, in other words, stabilizes, whatever the absolute 
volume of wealth, at a point which includes a systematic inequality” (Baudrillard 1998:52), and thus “we shall say that it is 
growth it self which is a function of inequality” (Ibid:53). 
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and capitalist re-production of urban space are out of scope of this thesis (which does not 
mean that such a topic is less important than greenwashing and production of urban space). 
As I have discussed, capitalist production of sustainable urban space have a possibility to be 
truly (or relatively) sustainable when we stand on the capitalist logic perspective (or the weak 
sustainability point of view).  
 
However, from the true sustainability perspective, all capitalist ‘sustainable’ projects (again, 
hereafter our scope of analysis is large-scale green-field development) are theoretically 
greenwashing. This finding is significant because of its theoretical implication that a radical 
change at philosophical, moral, and ethical levels must be required in order to achieve a true 
sustainable urban society. However, it seems that critical discussions from the true 
sustainability perspective will be no more productive in order for us to develop empirical 
methodology. In this sense, it is productive for us to think of a possible empirical method to 
distinguish large-scale sustainable urban projects suspected as greenwashing both by the 
capitalist logic and true sustainability perspectives, namely (a,g,0) projects, from (a,g,+) 
projects. How can (a,g,0) projects (equal to urban greenwashing) be empirically distinguished 
from (a,g,+) projects? Or, how can we empirically detect green-field urban projects suspected 
to employ the urban greenwashing strategy? In order to think of this point, let us integrate all 
theoretical discussions developed in this section, and try to build a possible theoretical 
framework of “urban” greenwashing that can be interpreted into an empirical framework. 
 
3. Urban Greenwashing: A Framework and Two Key Relations 
3.1. Summary and a framework 
Before we will go further, it must be productive to restate here important premises that the 
entire urban greenwashing logic in this thesis relies on: 
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(Premise-1: P-1) As our starting point, it is assumed that actual degradation of eco-climatic 
conditions on this globe is ongoing now, and this is the issue that human beings must urgently 
cope with. 
 
(P-2) As this eco-climatic challenge intensifies, a widespread concern about eco-climatic 
issues and green discourses have been formed (and are being formed) especially within the 
capitalist societies. 
 
(P-3) Sections 1.1 and 1.2 show that production of urban space is an indispensable component 
of capitalism in order to attain further capital accumulation (through commodification and 
exchange of space) as well as to fix over-accumulation crises (through spatio-temporal fixes). 
 
(P-4) Capitalist urban projects have entailed massive vegetation loss and a continuous 
increase both of absolute and relative emissions of CO2. Thus, they have been exposed to a 
wide range of pressures and demands to be eco-friendly, sustainable, low-carbon, or simply 
green (See section 1.3). 
 
(P-5) However, capitalists (a nexus of real estate developers, investors and governmental 
institutions, and other beneficiaries) cannot stop their production of urban space because it 
contradicts (P-3). Therefore, a possible pathway for capitalists is to produce capitalist cities so 
that they will attain both eco-climatic sustainability and economic growth, namely to make 
sustainable ‘capitalist’ cities. By introducing innovative planning and technologies that are 
eco-friendly and low-carbon, such sustainable capitalist cities can be achieved (cities 
reconciling between economic growth and sustainability by techno-fixes). 
 
(P-6) The feasibility and effectiveness of capitalist sustainable cities (and production of them) 
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are, however, quite questionable because of (1) a possibility of the Jevons paradox, of (2) 
socio-politico nature of modern industrial technology, of (3) unequal availability of 
cutting-edge technology, and of (4) a fundamental conflict between true sustainability and the 
capitalist logic of accumulation. Thus, capitalist green urban projects can be thought of as 
simply greenwashing: pretending fundamentally not-green as green in order to attain 
economic benefits by attracting green demands while securing themselves from green 
pressures. 
 
Based upon these premises, let us elaborate a possible urban greenwashing framework. As an 
archetypical framework, I have studied Delmas and Burbano’s greenwashing framework (See 
section 2.1), and I decided to ignore in this thesis a large part of “non-market external” drivers 
except for their green pressures and all “individual” drivers shown in their framework. Then, I 
simplified the greenwashing drivers of the framework into (D) the demand side (consumers 
and investors), (S) the supply side (companies, investors, government, beneficiaries), and (R) 
the regulation side (regulators, activists, NGOs, media, and non-beneficiary stakeholders). 
Let us elaborate these three categories of drivers (or actors) of urban greenwashing: 
 
(D) The demand side of urban greenwashing framework: 
As Delmas and Burbano state, pressures to be green and demands on green products from the 
demand side are playing a critical role in forming green marketing (including greenwashing) 
strategy of the supply side. In our urban greenwashing framework, the demand side consists 
of consumers who want to buy a real estate property for actual living or for a speculative 
purpose; and investors who invest in real estate developer(s) probably as a stockholder. Note 
that I would like to distinguish such stockholders from investors who directly invest in a 
particular urban project who are thus one of the direct beneficiaries of that project. I assume 
that those who directly invest in the urban project will act more like real estate developers 
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together with other beneficiaries that form a supply nexus. Let us elaborate the characteristics 
of consumers in our urban greenwashing framework. 
 
Newly developed (private) properties are expensive. Take residential properties as an example, 
prices of some Iskandar Malaysia residential properties are approximately three times higher 
than the median property price of the city region (we shall come back to this statistics in the 
“Empirical Analyses” section). Such expensive prices of new properties are not surprising if 
we think about current upward trends of overall property price level particularly within the 
emerging regions, for example, in 2014, prices gained in real terms in China by 13%, the 
Philippines by 13%, and Malaysia by 5% (Scatigna, Szemeret, and Tsatsaronis 2014:70-71).  
 
Taking such expensive prices into account, it is reasonable to assume that average consumers 
of capitalist urban projects are highly likely rich people who have a sufficient amount of 
saving, earn a relatively higher salary, and are (socio-financially) trustful enough to get a 
housing loan. Admittedly, within such a consumer group, there must be those who are 
completely not interested in eco-climatic issues. Nevertheless, it is no doubt that the number 
of green-conscious consumers in the real estate markets also has been increasing alongside 
with raising eco-climatic concerns. 
 
These green (rich) consumers in the real estate markets can have several reasons why they 
tend to be attracted by green urban properties. For some, it is simply because they are really 
worried about eco-climatic conditions of the globe, and thus only green properties are an 
ethically and/or morally justifiable option for them. For some, it is more like conspicuous 
consumption in Veblen’s sense25 in order to show their financial affordability to buy 
relatively expensive green properties (c.f., Griskevicius, Tybur, and Van den Bergh 2010). 
                                            
25 Thorstein Veblen wrote, in his The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), that “[t]he basis on which good repute in any 
highly organized industrial community ultimately rests is pecuniary strength; and the means of showing pecuniary strength, 
and so of gaining or retaining a good name, are leisure and a conspicuous consumption of goods” (1899/2007:59). 
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For some, it is because they would like to be socially differentiated from others by showing 
their ‘cultured’ and ‘sophisticated’ tastes in (or a style of consumption of) the place to live26 
(also c.f., Griskevicius, Tybur, and Van den Bergh 2010). For some, it is simply because they 
would like to live or work in a tranquil and green residential or office environment. It must 
note here that these reasons that form green demands can easily be reversed to pressures 
against or disinclination for non-green urban projects. 
 
(R) The regulation side of urban greenwashing framework: 
In our model, ‘pressures from regulation side’ mainly mean pressures to be green rather than 
pressures to stop greenwashing. As I have discussed, large-scale green-field urban projects 
likely entail a massive conversion of non-urban lands (e.g., vegetation, farmlands, and 
croplands) into new urban built-ups. Such a large-scale conversion of lands tends to be 
subjected to national/international environmental regulations and to monitoring and/or 
pressures by environmental activists, NGOs, environmental oriented politicians, and media 
(non stakeholders but yet conscious about eco-climatic issues). 
 
In addition, such a large-scale land conversion highly likely negatively affects 
socio-economically poor and weak neighbors in and around the construction site through 
displacements, environmental degradation, and the “improvements” of socio-economic 
conditions of the neighborhood (similar to gentrification). There is also a possibility that 
farmers and fishermen will be indirectly affected by the environmental damages caused by the 
construction. In tandem with environmental-conscious non-stakeholders, these 
non-beneficiaries but yet stakeholders of an urban project will push the supply side 
                                            
26 Related to this, Baudrillard writes about inconspicuous consumption that “is no longer displayed in ostentation (Veblen’s 
‘conspicuous consumption’), but in discretion, sobriety and self-effacement. These latter merely represent a further degree of 
luxury, an added element of ostentation which goes over into its opposite and, hence, a more subtle difference. 
Differentiation may then take the form of the rejection of objects, the rejection of ‘consumption’, and yet this still remains the 
very ultimate in consumption (Baudrillard 1970/1998:90).” Baudrillard’s inconspicuous consumption can be interpreted 
today as: to less consume of goods with a ‘cultured’ and ‘sophisticated’ manner. 
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(especially the real estate developers) to improve or even stop the project. 
  
(S) The supply side of urban greenwashing framework: 
As it was shown, the demand side generates both green demands (or willingness to pay for 
sustainable properties) and green pressures against or disinclination for non-green properties. 
The regulation side forms green pressures against green-field capitalist urban projects per se 
because of eco-climatic impacts associated with the projects. Under such a situation, the 
supply side, which is a nexus between real estate developers, direct investors, government 
institutions, and other beneficiaries, confronts two challenges: (1) how to manage green 
pressures both from the demand and regulation sides; and (2) how to keep or increase the 
market competitiveness, and thus, exchange values, of its projects by reaping green demands 
from the demand side. However, as the premise 6 states, it is a tall task for capitalist urban 
projects to achieve true sustainable conditions including the minimization of vegetation loss 
prior to actual land procurement. An effective way for the supply side to cope with the two 
challenges above while making no (or less) efforts to be sustainable is to employ urban 
greenwashing strategy. 
 
Urban greenwashing works, similar to greenwashing of consumer goods, at the levels of 
marketing and advertisement. By disseminating ‘promised’ green images through several 
marketing tools such as a master plan, a project name, taglines, brochures, artist impressions, 
miniature models, posters, video clips, advertising posts on newspapers etc., the supply side 
can, intentionally or unintentionally, generate untrue (or overestimated) green impressions on, 
namely greenwash, capitalist green-field projects (production of urban space). Such urban 
greenwashing works so that it will respond to the two challenges stated above: (Function-1) 
to manage green pressures both from the demand and regulation sides by obscuring 
environmental damages caused by an urban project, convincing the regulation side, and 
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justifying the project; and (Function-2) to keep or increase the market competitiveness, and 
thus, exchange values, of the project by reaching at green demands through ‘promised’ green 
images disseminated by several marketing tools. 
 
Figure 4 below shows a framework of urban greenwashing developed by integrating all 
theoretical discussions so far. It shows a model mechanism of why a capitalist green-field 
urban project needs to be greenwashed and how urban greenwashing strategy possibly works 
for avoiding green pressures as well as for keeping or increasing the exchange value of the 
project. 
 
Our theoretical discussions in order to develop a possible framework of urban greenwashing 
are about to arrive at their goal. I would like to finish this section by briefly discussing two 
possible relationships suggested by the two functionalities of urban greenwashing I have just 
attained. These two relationships shall be a ‘bridge’ between the theoretical considerations 
and the empirical analyses in the next chapter. 
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3.2. Relation 1: Environmental destruction and promised greenness? 
The first relation suggested by (Function-1), namely urban greenwashing for avoiding or 
mitigating green pressures on a capitalist urban project, is that the degree of environmental 
destruction caused by an urban project and the degree of ‘promised’ greenness of the project. 
We can assume that the more serious the environmental destruction (e.g., the larger the extent 
of vegetation destruction) occurs due to the construction of a project, the stronger green 
pressures both from the regulation and demand sides on (and the less attractiveness of) the 
project become. The supply side must cope with such green pressures (and less attractiveness) 
by making more efforts to convey green images of the project. Such increasing ‘green’ efforts 
can be detected as an increasing degree of ‘promised’ greenness of the project within various 
marketing tools. Thus, it can be theoretically predicted that, if we can properly operationalize 
(i) the degree of environmental destruction and (ii) the degree of promised greenness of a 
green-field urban project, we can expect to observe a positive relation between these two 
variables, namely (i) and (ii). In accordance with the definition of greenwashing in this thesis, 
urban projects showing higher degrees both of (i) the environmental destruction and (ii) the 
promised greenness shall be determined as a perfect example of urban greenwashing. 
 
3.3. Relation 2: Price level and promised greenness? 
The second relation suggested by (Function-2), namely urban greenwashing for keeping or 
increasing the market competitiveness, and thus, exchange value, of a capitalist urban project, 
is that the price level of an urban project and the degree of ‘promised’ greenness of the project. 
We can assume that the more the supply side makes efforts to convey green images of a 
project, and thus the more green images of the project successfully reached at the demand side 
(green-conscious rich consumers), the higher the price level of the project remains or becomes 
relative to other rival projects because of successfully reaping green demands. Thus, it can be 
theoretically predicted that, if we can properly operationalize (ii) the degree of promised 
greenness and (iii) the price level of an green-field urban project, we may observe a positive 
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relation between these two variables, namely (ii) and (iii). 
 
By empirically analyzing these two relations predicted by our framework of urban 
greenwashing, namely (i)-(ii) and (ii)-(iii), it can be not only empirically detected (a,g,0: 
greenwashing) projects, but also revealed that urban greenwashing strategy is used by 
capitalists for fighting against competitors and for achieving further capital accumulation. 
 
 
Part. II: Empirical Analyses 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Overview of the study area: Iskandar Malaysia 
In 2006, the government of Malaysia inaugurated the Iskandar Malaysia Project (hereafter 
called Iskandar), which is a government-led massive urban development mainly in Johor 
Bahru district situated in the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula (see Figure 5). Iskandar aims 
at, by 2025, doubling its population, doubling GDP per capita, and generating five times 
larger GDP compared to the year 2005 (Iskandar Malaysia Comprehensive Development 
Plan27 2006). These ambitious goals have attracted a huge volume of investments from all 
over the world, especially from Singapore that is located just next to J.B. (IRDA 2011; 
JETRO 2014) (See Figure 6 and Table 3). Iskandar is a complex mixture of Malaysian elites’ 
motivation to attain further economic growth through urban projects and global (especially 
Singaporean) capital’s motivation to sustain its capital accumulation (Rizzo and Glasson 
2011; 2012; Rizzo and Khan 2013). 
 
                                            
27 Hereafter called as Iskandar CDP. 
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[Fig 5] Reference map of Iskandar Malaysia 
Note: This map is created by synthesizing several information: geographical shapes of urban 
area are made by the author from a satellite image provided by Esri (2015); Mukim 
(Sub-district borders) are made by the author based upon the GIS information on WEB GIS 
Wilayah Iskandar28; locations of Iskandar Malaysia development area and five flagships + 
Danga bay are made by the author based on Iskandar CDP (2006). 
 
                                            
28 http://geoportal.johor.gov.my/mapserver2012/geojohor/wilayah/index.html 
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[Fig 6] Cumulative investments (commitment basis) to Iskandar Malaysia project 
during 2006 to 2014 
Note: Graphed by the author based on the source: Japan External Trade Organization, 
Singapore Branch (2014). Approximately 35 % of the total investments came from overseas. 
 
 
[Table 3] Top five countries contributing to foreign investments to Iskandar Malaysia 
project 
Note: As this table clearly shows, Singapore is the largest investors to the project. Tabled by 
the author based on the source: Japan External Trade Organization, Singapore Branch (2014). 
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articles issued within the region have been warning a potential property bubble within the 
Iskandar region (e.g., Wei-Shen and Musa 2014; Yahya 2014; Lee 2014; Rakwan 2014; 
Siew-Ying 2014; Tan 2014). In addition, Iskandar can be seen as a typical example of 
spatio-temporal fixes in order to avoid the crisis of regional-level over accumulation of the 
Singaporean economy. The global capital that is constantly flowing into Singapore, a 
world-leading capital entrepôt, is now overflowing beyond Singapore’s quite limited territory 
to neighboring areas such as the Riau islands and Iskandar through capitalist production and 
re-production of urban space (Bunnell, Nuzaini and Sidaway 2006: Rizzo and Glasson 2011; 
2012). 
 
An important aspect of Iskandar from the perspective of this thesis is that the project 
emphasizes its aspiration to be “eco-friendly,” “sustainable,” and “low-carbon” (Iskandar 
CDP 2006; The Guardian by F. Harvey 2012; Joeman at IRDA 2012; Hussein at IRDA 2014; 
Iskandar Malaysia Official Website 2014). It is observable that these aspirations to be 
“sustainable” are not only flowered in both public and private documentations related to the 
project but also materialized even in miniature models and artist impressions of Iskandar 
residential and office projects (e.g., Figure 7 and 8 below). 
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[Fig 7] Miniature model of Kota Iskandar zone, a new central administrative district 
Note: The picture taken by the author in 2014. This model displays a metropolis with many 
forest reserves. 
 
[Fig 8] Miniature model of Country Garden condominiums, an intensive and massive 
development ongoing in Danga bay 
Note: The picture taken by the author in 2014. According to this model, exclusive gardens 
will be created on the rooftop of the condominiums. 
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Despite its aspirations to be sustainable, there is evidence that Iskandar has impacted on the 
environments and ecosystems within the region. For instances, Nasongkhla and Sintusingha 
(2013) report that the local people have been witnessing the decrease of mangroves and other 
vegetation, the decrease of water quality, and the loss of biodiversity. Another study revealed 
that around 25 % of the citizens in Johor Bahru worry about negative environmental and 
ecological impacts caused by Iskandar (Rabe, Osman, Bachok 2014). As for CO2 emissions, it 
is estimated that, in 2025, Iskandar (when it will be fully developed) even in a Low Carbon 
Society (LCS) scenario (means that all possible socio-technological measures to reduce CO2 
emissions have been taken) will consume 2.6 times larger amount of energy, and will emit 2.3 
times larger volume of CO2 compared to the levels of 2005 (Natsuoka, Simson, and Gomi 
2013). These values will be, in a Business as Usual (BaU) scenario, 3.3 times and 3.4 times 
larger respectively (See Figure 9.1 and 9.2). In reality, it is suspected that even the LCS 
scenario is hard to be attained. One clear fact supporting this suspicion is that Iskandar has 4.7 
billion Malaysian Ringgit (RM) budget for highway construction while it allocated only 
(compared to the budget for car-promotion) 3.0 billion RM has Light Rail Transit (LRT) and 
Mass and Rapid Transit (MRT) projects (IRDA 2008). Dispersed mega-gated residential 
projects of Iskandar and “proposed urban highways are more likely to encourage rather than 
discourage the use of private vehicles” (Rizzo and Khan 2013).  
 
As another problem of the project, it is reported that there are many socio-cultural impacts 
associated with Iskandar developments. For example, several Kampongs (traditional-local 
communities, in Malay language, whose residents tend to be socially weak and poor) and 
squatter settlements within the Iskandar region are now in danger of both direct and indirect 
displacement without sufficient compensations and considerations (Rizzo and Glasson 
2012:424; The Star Online by Z. Musa 2012, Nasongkhla and Sintusingha 2013). It can be 
observed that Singaporeanization and Bumiputralization are ongoing (Nasongkhla and 
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Sintusingha 2013) in the cityscapes of Johor Bahru, which means that homogenization of the 
urban landscapes and urban lifestyle based exclusively upon Singapore and/or Bumiputra 
(dominant Malay ethnicity) rationalities and preferences. 
 
 
[Fig 9.1: Left panel] Estimated energy consumption in two different scenarios: Business 
as Usual (BaU) and Low Carbon Society (LCS) 
[Fig 9.2: Right panel] Estimated CO2 emissions in the case BaU and LCS 
Note: As the graphs clearly show, Iskandar project will consume and emit more amounts of 
energy and CO2 even in the LCS scenario. These graphs adapted (and modified by the author) 
from Natsuoka, Simson, and Gomi (2013). 
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In the chapter 3, I theorized that by urban greenwashing, an urban project will avoid or 
mitigate increasing green pressures while keeping or increasing its exchange values by 
reaching at lucrative green demands. In our framework urban greenwashing, thus, comprises 
two major functionalities: (1) obscuring environmental damages caused by a project; (2) 
keeping or increasing market competitiveness (exchange value) of the project. 
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between (i) environmental destruction level and (ii) promised greenness level of an urban 
project; and (2) relationship between (ii) promised greenness level and (iii) price level of the 
project. By operationalizing and empirically analyzing these variables and relationships, we 
can confirm two functions actually work under the urban greenwashing framework. Let us, 
then, elaborate these two relationships. 
 
For ease of operationalization process, let us write (i) as [EnvD], (ii) as [Grn], and (iii) as 
[Prc]. If we can detect a positive relation between [Grn] and [EnvD], namely [Grn]↑∧ 
[EnvD]↑, we can conclude within our framework that the promised greenness of the projects 
that show a combination between high [EnvD] and [Grn] is used, as a greenwashing function, 
for (1) obscuring its environmental damage. An important note here is that even though I 
implicitly assume a causal relation [EnvD]↑→[Grn]↑, this causal relation cannot be reliably 
proved only by the analyses of this thesis. [Grn]↑→[EnvD]↑ or a dialectical causal relation 
between two variables could also be a plausible possibility. Similarly, if we can observe a 
positive relation between [Grn] and [Prc], namely [Grn]↑∧ [Prc]↑, we can conclude within 
our framework that the promised greenness of the projects that show a combination between 
high [Grn] and [Prc] is used, as a greenwashing function, for (2) increasing its price level 
(Again, our implicit assumption [Grn]↑→[Prc]↑ cannot be convincingly proved by our 
analyses. [Prc]↑→[Grn]↑ or a dialectical causal relation could be a plausible possibility). 
 
It is important to note here that there are other possibilities of [Grn]-[EnvD] and [Grn]-[Prc] 
relations as shown in Table 4.1 and 4.2 below. 
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[Table 4.1] All possibilities of [Grn]-[EnvD] relation 
 
 
First, let us study each possibility of [Grn]-[EnvD] relation on Table 4.1: 
(Quadrant I) [Grn]↑∧ [EnvD]↓, or Greening as Promised possibility, is that when 
promised greenness becomes higher, environmental destruction level becomes lower. This 
can be interpreted that, real estate developers actually tried to reduce eco-climatic impacts in 
accordance with the promised greenness and green efforts. This possibility corresponds to 
(a,g,+) on Table 2. 
(Quadrant II) [Grn]↑∧ [EnvD]↑ shows a possibility of urban greenwashing function (1), 
and thus a pure example of urban greenwashing. Disseminated ‘promised’ greenness is 
highly likely working for avoiding or mitigating green pressures. This possibility corresponds 
to (a,g,0) on Table 2. 
 
(Quadrant III) If [Grn] is 0 (no promised greenness was observed amongst all target urban 
projects) or almost constant (to disseminate promised greenness, or green marketing, is just a 
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common strategy for all target urban projects, and thus it has no differentiation effect from the 
marketing point of view) and a majority of target projects shows low environmental 
destruction level [EnvD----], this relation implies that these projects have not damaged the 
surrounding environments while their developers are not actively marketing such fact, namely 
Unassuming Greening possibility. 
 
(Quadrant IV) On the other hand, if [Grn] is 0 or almost constant and a majority of target 
projects shows high environmental destruction level, this relation implies that many projects 
destruct environments without any hesitation and even without any effort to obscure or justify 
such destruction, namely Crude Destruction possibility. 
 
In addition to these four possibilities, there is a possibility of observing a random 
distribution of [Grn] and [EnvD]. 
 
[Table 4.2] All possibilities of [Grn]-[Prc] relation 
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Then, let us study each possibility of [Grn]-[Prc] relation on Table 4.2: 
 
(Quadrant I) [Grn]↑∧ [Prc]↓, or Greening for Poor possibility, is that when promised 
greenness becomes higher, price level becomes lower. This is theoretically possible, but 
practically least likely. A possible situation can be that a ‘pro-poor’ government develops 
many sustainable ‘public’ projects while the rich is not attracted (or not allowed to buy) such 
green properties (note that these projects are not necessarily ‘truly sustainable’ because we 
just analyze the [Grn]-[Prc] relationship. In order to confirm this point, we should also refer to 
the [Grn]-[EnvD] relationship of each project at the same time. See the section 5.5). 
 
(Quadrant II) [Grn]↑∧ [Prc]↑ shows a possibility of urban greenwashing function (2). 
Disseminated ‘promised’ greenness is highly likely working for keeping or increasing market 
competitiveness of each target projects by reaching at green demands. A project located on 
the quadrant II corresponds to (a,g,0) on Table 2 if that project also shows [Grn]↑∧ [EnvD]↑ 
(See the section 5.5). 
 
(Quadrant III) If [Grn] is 0 or almost constant and a majority of target projects shows low 
price level [Prc----], this relation implies that these projects are merely a group of cheap 
property developments (Cheap Developments). 
 
(Quadrant IV) On the other hand, if [Grn] is 0 or almost constant and a majority of target 
projects shows high price level [----Prc], this relation implies that these projects are a group of 
luxury developments that are not relaying on green marketing but on other marketing 
strength. 
 
Tateishi (2015) 
 50 
In addition to these four possibilities, there is a possibility of observing a random 
distribution of [Grn] and [Prc]. 
 
An important empirical weak point of this methodology is to reduce urban greenwashing, as a 
complex socio-politico-economic phenomenon, into mere spatial-numerical relationships (I 
would like to call this as spatial-numerical reductionism). In reality, urban greenwashing is 
developed and implemented by a supply nexus, which comprises a number of individuals, 
within a web of complex social interactions both with the demand and regulation sides. In this 
sense, this methodology cannot perfectly reveal what people in a supply nexus, particularly 
in real estate developers, are thinking, that is one of the key information to understand the 
causality of [Grn]-[EnvD] and [Grn]-[Prc] positive/negative relations (even including a slight 
possibility that these relations are just a coincidence). In order to improve this empirical weak 
point, I initially planned to conduct interviews with people in real estate developers engaging 
in Iskandar project. However, due to time and budgetary constraints, such interviews could 
not be done. Nevertheless, I believe that, as a step for more valid and reliable empirical 
studies, to observe any positive or negative relations between target variables is academically 
significant in order to understand and built the empirical foundation of urban greenwashing 
research. 
 
The following section shall specify target urban projects, operationalize required variables, 
and explain data collection method for this methodology within the context of Iskandar.  
 
4.3. Targets, variables, collection methods, notes, and limitations 
Target Projects: 
38 bungalow and terrace-house residential projects (some of them are mixed-use) related to 
Iskandar were chosen (see Fig 10) for our empirical analyses from a real estate website 
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Iskandar 360° @ Property.CC29. Although a majority of target projects are located 
within/around Nusajaya zone (refer to Fig 5) where a number of intensive green-field urban 
projects is ongoing, few projects are situated in the areas far from Nusajaya. Even though 
these projects are different in size, location, concept, and project term, they are common in 
project type (bungalow and/or terrace house), being Iskandar-related, being relatively new (or 
still under-construction). 
 
There are two reasons why condominium and apartment projects were excluded from this 
study: (1) project site size of such projects tends to be smaller than that of bungalow and 
terrace house projects (this is not preferable from the methodological point of view since 
NASA satellite images used to estimate vegetation loss provide only 250-m2 spatial resolution. 
See the next section); (2) it is hard to estimate, within a limited period of time, to what extent 
collective facilities (e.g., a sky bar lounge, a sky common space, or a yacht harbor30) and 
high-rise architectures itself are reflected in a price of each compartment. 
 
One important note here is that, as mentioned previously, many of projects undergoing in and 
around Nusajaya are green-field, and a larger part of Nusajaya is covered by vegetation. Thus, 
project sites most likely were (or are being) procured by eliminating such vegetation. This 
means that, at the moment of selecting target projects, there is already a latent bias to higher 
vegetation loss (higher environmental destruction). Nevertheless, as we shall see later on, the 
extent of vegetation loss of each target project largely differs from project to project (see 
Figure 16), so this bias can be considered as a minor issue. 
 
                                            
29 http://www.property.cc/iskandar-360 
30 Not few number of Iskandar condominium projects are situated in bay areas (e.g., Danga bay and Kota Iskandar bay area), 
and have a yacht harbor for their owners. 
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[Fig 10] Locations of 38 bungalow and terrace-house (some of them are mixed-use) 
projects 
Note: A majority of target projects are situated in and around Nusajaya zone where the most 
intensive developments are ongoing. The shape of each target project was made by the author 
based on the official master plan of each project and Google Map. 
 
Promised Greenness Score [Grn]: 
A promised greenness (proposed and advertised in a master plan, brochures, documents, 
websites, and other marketing tools) score of each target project shall be evaluated based 
upon three criteria below, and it has a range between 0 to 3 points. 
 
(1) Green Project Name (0.0 ~ 0.5 ~ 1.0 Point): 
A project name can be seen as an important element of marketing and adverting strategy for 
the project. To use green words, such as green, eco, and sustainable in the project name shows 
a clear commitment of the developers to green marketing. If a project name has a direct green 
Tateishi (2015) 
 53 
word like green, eco, environmental, eco-friendly, environmental-friendly, sustainable, 
low-carbon, nature, natural, low-carbon, the project will get 1 point for this criterion. If a 
project name has an indirect green word like garden, park, countryside, the project will get 
0.5 point for this criterion. 
 
(2) Green Planning and Concepts (0 ~ 1 Point): 
Separated from a project name, if a project uses green words and/or concepts such as green, 
eco, environmental, eco-friendly, environmental-friendly, sustainable, low-carbon, 
nature, natural, low-carbon, greenery, gardens, forests, park, ecology, sanctuary, 
botanical, grass, this project will acquire 1 point for this criterion. In this evaluation, there is 
no scoring weight based upon the number of green words and/or the importance of each green 
word in order to avoid an arbitrary manipulation of the outcome. 
 
(3) Other Green-features (0 ~ 1 Point): 
This criterion counts other outstanding green features of each target project. If a project has 
an environmental certificate or award, an actual plan in its master plan to have huge 
gardens or forest reserves, an actual plan to install “environmental,” “energy-efficient,” 
and/or “low-carbon” technologies, the project will acquire 1 point for this criterion. In this 
evaluation, there is no scoring weight based upon the number of green features and/or the 
importance of each feature in order to avoid an arbitrary manipulation of the outcome. 
 
Required information to conduct these evaluations was attained by studying various official 
marketing tools such as a master plan, websites, brochures and documents, press releases, and 
video clips of each project. Information and ads on unofficial websites were also utilized for a 
complementary purpose. I fully agree with an opinion that these scores are rough and 
over-simplified, and may have a problem in its reliability and validity. Nevertheless, taking 
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into consideration limited time and resources for this thesis project, these scores will perform 
sufficiently for our analytical purpose as the first step on the further researches. 
 
Vegetation Loss (representing Environmental Destruction) [EnvD]: 
The loss of vegetation such as grasslands, forests, mangroves, and croplands can be a reliable 
representative indicator of environmental destruction. Vegetation, especially tropical rain 
forests and mangroves observed in the Iskandar region, contains complex ecosystems that 
consist of many life forms (Begon, Townsend, and Happer 2006:24; Aluri 2013). In addition, 
the loss of waterfront vegetation, especially mangroves, will also impact the quality of aquatic 
ecosystems (Aluri 2013). Thus, the destruction of vegetation directly and indirectly impacts 
on regional ecosystems. Besides, the loss of vegetation can be an indirect indicator for 
evaluating CO2 emissions. This is because, as previously mentioned in the section 1.3, the 
loss of vegetation directly decreases the total capacity of CO2 absorption of the globe. 
 
As such, our empirical method employs the level of vegetation loss as a representative 
indicator of overall environmental destruction caused by each target project. For this purpose, 
I attained Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) satellite images Product 
Code: MOD13Q (Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI))31and32 provided by the United State 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). EVI works based on a scientific 
fact that the reflection rate of near infrared light (NIR) and visible light (VIS) differ between 
dense and healthy leaves and parse and unhealthy leaves. For instance, according to Weier 
and Herring (2000), dense and healthy leaves reflect 50 % of NIR and 8 % of VIS whereas 
sparse and unhealthy leaves reflect 40 % of NIR and 30 % of VIS. EVI can indicate a density 
                                            
31 https://lpdaac.usgs.gov/products/modis_products_table/mod13q1 
32 To be accurate, MOD13Q data set contains two different indices: Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) and 
Enhanced Vegetation Index (EVI). Even though these two indices are complement each other (Vegetation Index and 
Phenology Lab n.d), EVI has some advantages over NDVI, for example, reduction of atmospheric distortion and sensitivity 
for slight vegetation change (Solano et al 2010). 
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of vegetation by detecting and calculating these slight differences of NIR and VIS values33. 
These EVI satellite images have 250-m2 spatial resolution and 64-day34 temporal resolution 
during 2000 - 2013. For an ease of data processing, EVI values were reclassified into 12 
classes, and analyzed both at a regional level and at an each target project level. 
 
Property Price [Prc]: 
Because Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA), the head management office of 
Iskandar project, does not publicly provide reliable and comprehensive socio-cultural and 
property data within the Iskandar region35, it is very hard to gather a set of accurate price level 
data of properties within the region. Thus, I collected price data (as of 2015 March) of more 
than 8,500 property advertisements posted on four Malaysian property websites: Propwall.my, 
iProperty.com, PropertyGuru Malaysia, and Property.CC. The set of price data collected was 
categorized into 131 different town levels. The data includes prices of all types of properties, 
namely, empty land, residential, commercial, and industrial properties. By analyzing the data, 
a median square feet price (RM36/sf) of all types of properties by each town level was 
calculated. In addition to this price data, a middle price (not median price) of each target 
project was calculated based on more accurate sources, namely official marketing tools (e.g., 
a website and a master plan), although the data from commercial websites were used for a 
complementary purpose. These middle prices of target projects were attained by summing up 
the minimum and maximum prices of a project and dividing this value by 2. 
 
 
                                            
33 As for more technical detail of EVI, refer to Solano et al 2010 pp.2-3. 
34 The maximum temporal resolution is 16 days. For an ease of data processing, 64-day resolution was selected instead. 
35 “What makes the situation difficult to read is the lack of transparency from the Iskandar Regional Development Authority 
(IRDA), who only releases quarterly figures on monetary investment but not job creation or population growth” (DrWealth 
2014). My experience also shows that IRDA is not willing to provide information and data regarding Iskandar. I asked, by a 
letter with a study purpose, the authority to provide information and data via an appropriate connection (July 2014); however, 
I have not yet received any reply from the authority even as of May of 2015. A conversation with an urban researcher in 
Johor Bahru (intentionally covers his affiliation) reveals that IRDA is unwilling to help him by providing information that he 
requires. 
36 RM: Malaysian Ringgit 
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Distance [Dis]: 
The shortest distance of each town or project from Link-1, Link-2, or Kota Iskandar (see Fig 
5) was calculated by using ArcGIS software based on geographical coordinates of three 
important points and towns (or projects). A center point of each town (or project) shape was 
used for this calculation (see Figure 11 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
[Fig 11] Calculation method of the shortest distance 
Note: Center points were automatically calculated by ArcGIS software. 
 
I would like to finish this section by summing up all unit, source, note, and limitation of data 
and variables used for this thesis (see Table 5). 
  
A town (or project) shape
Kota Iskandar
Link-2
Link-1
The center point 
of a project
Distance = 6
Distance = 4
Distance = 3
Dis = 3 shall be used for the 
shortest distance of this town.
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[Table 5] Summary of unit, source, and limitation of data and variables  
 
 
 
Category
Variable / Geographical
Data
Abbreviati
on Type Unit Collection Method / Source Note / Limitation
Mukim Administrative
Borders - Map Data -
Mukim (Sub-district) boders
were made by the author based
on the GIS information on WEB
GIS Wilayah Iskandar
(http://geoportal.johor.gov.my/m
apserver2012/geojohor/wilayah/i
ndex.html)
-
Rough Urban Area - Map Data -
Made based on "World Imagery"
(Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye,
Earthstar Geographics,
CNES/Airbus DS, USDA,
USGS, AEX, Getmapping,
Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, swisstopo,
and the GIS User Community
2015)
-
Five Flagships + Danga
bay - Map Data -
Made based on a map in the
Iskandar CDP book. -
38 Projects within Iskandar - Target Project
Iskandar 360° in Property.CC
(http://www.property.cc/iskandar
-360)
Collected relatively new (as of
2015 March) bungalow and
terrace house projects related
to Iskandar Malaysia project
mainly within/around Nusajaya
zone where intensive
developments are onging. Few
projects outside of Nusajaya
were also included in order to
be compared.
Project Sites - Map Data Site
Made based on Google Map
and an official master plan etc of
each project.
-
Promised
Greenness Promised Greenness Score [Grn] Variable Pts (Points 0 - 3)
Required information to conduct
these scoring was attained by
studying an official master plan,
a website, brochures and
documents, and press releases
of each project.
These scores are rough and
over-simplified, and may have a
problem in its reliability and
validity.
Enhanced Vegetation Index
(EVI) [EnvD] Variable Class (1 - 12)
NASA (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration) MODIS
(MODerate resolution Imaging
Spectroradiometer) Product
[MOD13Q]
(https://lpdaac.usgs.gov/product
s/modis_products_table/mod13
q1)
250-m^2 spatial resolution; 64
days temporal resolution during
2000 - 2013. EVI values were
reclassified into 12 classes.
There may be, in raw data,
errors in values due to technical
issues.
Decrease of Vegetation
(Absolute Loss of
Vegetation) between 2000 -
2013
[Ab-EnvD] Variable Km2 (Square Km)
Calculated based on EVI
There may be errors caused by
the problem of raw date.
Percentage of Vegetation
Loss during 2000 - 2013 (%
Decrease of Vegetation)
[%-EnvD] Variable % (Percent)
Calculated based on EVI There may be errors caused by
the problem of raw date.
Town (Taman) Location - Map Data - Made based on Google Map. -
Median Square Feet (sf)
Price of All Types of
Properties by Town Level
- Variable
RM / sf
Malaysian Ringgit per
Square Feet
Gathered from several property
Website: Propwall.my
(http://www.propwall.my/)
iProperty.com
(http://www.iproperty.com.my/)
PropertyGuru Malaysia
(http://www.propertyguru.com.m
y/)
Property.CC
(http://www.property.cc/)
The total number of collected
samples is approximately 8,500
within 131 towns. The data is
as of 2015 March. This data
includes prices of all types of
properties, namely, empty land,
residential, commercial, and
industrial properties.
Shortest Distance from
Link-1, Link-2, or Kota
Iskandar
[Dis] Variable Geographical Unit
Calculated based on several
geographical data by using
ArcGIS software.
Link-1: The Causeway
(Tambak Johor), Link-2: The
Second Link (Laluan Kedua
Malaysia-Singapura). See the
Map.1. A center point of each
town project shape was used
for the calculation.
Middle Price of the Target
Projects [Prc] Variable RM/ / sf
Mainly attained from an official
master plan, a website,
brochures, and advertisements
of each project. Commercial
websites were used as a
complementary purpose:
Propwall.my; iProperty.com;
PropertyGuru Malaysia; and
Property CC.
These middle prices were
attained by summing up the
minimum and maximum prices
of a project and dividing this
value by 2.
Pricing
Target
Basic
Environmental
Destruction
Tateishi (2015) 
 58 
5. Outcomes and Discussions 
5.1. Direction 
An epistemologically reliable study must be based upon knowledge both of the whole and the 
parts of a subject to be studied. What appears as an observed phenomenon in a part as local 
can be a general trend of the whole, and vice verse. In order to avoid this sort of 
misinterpretation of observed phenomena, this chapter tries to discuss both the whole (the 
entire Iskandar Malaysia development area)37 and the parts (the target projects) except for the 
coming “5.2. Promised greenness score” section. Due to severe time and resource limitations, 
it was impossible to quantify the promised greenness scores of all Iskandar and non-Iskandar 
projects. This implies that this thesis still holds an epistemological uncertainty about promised 
greenness score. An extreme example of such uncertainty is that a number of ‘high’ promised 
greenness projects, regardless of whether or not they are cheap and expensive; large and 
small; new and old, can be observed in the entire Iskandar region. If this occurred, the coming 
empirical discussions would be imposed to a serious adjustment, or even judged as invalid. 
Even though more than 8,500 observations of property ads in the entire Iskandar tells green 
marketing and advertising are not common, it is methodologically honest to note here that this 
thesis relies on an assumption that ‘high’ promised greenness scores amongst the population 
are associated with at least one socio-economic factor unique to each project, and thus 
expected to show an uneven or random spatial distribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
37 Admittedly, it is true that a larger analytical scale can be a more proper ‘whole’ of this study, for instances, the entire 
country of Malaysia, the entire region of Southeast Asia, or even the entire world. Especially, a discussion and observation in 
a world (global) scale is important to grasp a global dynamism of Capitalist production of urban space. It is; however, hard 
for this thesis to deal with such a scale of analysis due to time, resource, and even page limitations. 
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5.2. Promised greenness score 
Results: 
Table 6 shows the scoring outcome of the promised greenness score [Grn] of 38 target 
Iskandar projects. Amongst 38 targets, three urban projects got maximum score 3.0. 
 
[Table 6] Outcome of scoring [Grn] of 38 target Iskandar residential projects 
Note: Sentences and words on the “Actual Green Words and Features” are directly retrieved 
from various sources. These sources are shown in the Appendix.A as a form of URL links. 
 
StartYear CompYear
(1) Green
Project Name
(2) Green
Planning and
Concepts
(3) Other
Green-
features
Promised
Greenness
Score
Actual Green Words and Features
(Reference of all sentences here is in the appendix section)
2007 2018 1 1 1 3
Certificates, Award-winning Eco Township, Eco Village is Now Available for Sale!,
...inspiring environment created to inculcate a desire to learn and engage with nature.
,green building, Eco Homes
2013 2016 1 1 1 3
Amongst soft grass. Beyond its magnificent gates, a world of surreal beauty awaits: a
pristine lake in the shape of a butterfly, a plethora of breathtaking gardens and parks,
masterfully-crafted steel sculptures, luxuriant greenery as far as your eyes can wander,
and indulging facilities. "Located within Nusajaya and directly neighbouring EduCity,
EcoBotanic is a premium gated and guarded township featuring cluster, semi-detached
and bungalow homes."
2016 1 1 1 3
"FORESTA" "ECO HAB"..living in nature's miracle…, A sanctuary that protects…A home
for nature.. In an effort to create a natural and holistic ecosystem, 15 % of the total land
are in Setia Eco Cascadia is reserved for the cultivation of flora…Eco Homes...Stroll amid
the green. The green connectors in Setia Eco Cascadia serve as....their back garden
through the natural greenery...the residents to experience a deeper connection with
Mother Nature...can be found in these green paradise...one of the many eco-friendly
features of Setia Eco Cascadia is the linear garden concept....
Ongoing 0.5 1 1 2.5
*Official Website very inspires Greenery + Masterplan shows a large space of green area*
Inspired by nature and the art of living naturally,…on the fringe of a natural mangrove
forest, a 12.5 acre wellness sanctuary makes this holistic retreat a self-sustained haven...
with its unique blend of landed homes and green spaces...Peppered with green pockets...
Plenty of greenery to greet you, wherever you may be....Centerpark: The best place to
take in Avira's green and lush landscape...sense of space and harmony with nature...
2008 2012 0 1 1 2
a gated and guarded community..., it features lush greenery via tis landscaped parks and
gardens with the lake, forest, wetland and canal themes...., it features 7 parks with 31 lush
gardens with several themes such as the Green Lawn Garden, Sacred Garden and valley
Garden, as well as a 20 acre forest and 2km-long lake water land.,garden-themed luxury
residential development.
1992 2025 0 1 1 2
Designed within a natural environment, Leisure Farm Resort's master plan also
emphasizes on the preservation of the existing ecology occupied with its green program to
enhance the qualit of life... Private Tropical Sanctuary: Experience countryside tranquility
amidst lush greenery, soothing waterways, tropically inspired recreational facilities and
manicured gardens..., 12 precincts which aim to provide a comfortable abode along with
eco-friendly surroundings…a natural mangrove forest, 50 acres of orchard and plantation
including the award-winning 22-acre Kayu Manis Orchard and Nursery. There are four
community parks, 11 themed gardens, and barbecue areas scattered around....22-acre
award winning orchard, 4 Community Parks, 11 Themed Gardens..."If you’re thinking
about buying Leisure Farm Properties because you love the concept and is indeed a
nature-lover, then purchases near the launch price would be a bargain for you (Propwall
Report)."
2013 0 1 1 2
Environmental architecture is heavily emphasized in Horizon Hills. A commitment to meet
the needs for a healthy community. Large areas in the township is dedicated to botanical
nature such as parks, lush green fields, and meandering waterways complemented by
boardwalks and long continuous jogging trails. Tree lined boulevards and verdant green
reserves nurture an active lifestyle for you and your family.
Ongoing 0 1 1 2
CITY FOR THE HEART'S DESIRES, NATURE'S BEAUTY FOR THE SOUL, Nature's
Capital City. This is where the perfect balance of yin and yang come together across
1,800 acres of world-class architecture and nature's design….,, you will always be
connected to nature via eco parks, green pockets, water bodies, and green corridors.
Because this is a sustainable city built to always flourish within 40% nature. Life's perfect
balance in the beauty of nature, for today and tomorrow. This is Nature's Capital City.
2015 0 1 1 2
Closed to 650-acre Nusajaya Regional Park..., l Enjoy cleaner air, cooler surroundings,
greener environment and enchanting views.
1997 2013 0 1 1 2
The township’s most outstanding feature is its lush greenery which includes an award-
winning 20-acre town park as well as smaller parks, gardens and mature streetscape.
Verdant Township, ..residents with a green, peaceful environment..., Award winning 20-
acre town park.., Australian "Green-Street Concept" to provide an exclusive lifestyle
befitting the modern era. Its impeccable heritage in characterised by extensively
landscaped environment, ample green, meticulously designed houses and wide access
ways.
0 1 1 2
Enhanced by lush greenery of 3.8 acres townpark, this is home to smart living where you
truly belong. ..Green Features: Solar water heating system…rain water harvesting system
…smart home system…enjoy stylish green living with reduced electricity costs.
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[Table 6 Continued] Outcome of scoring [Grn] of 38 target Iskandar residential projects 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the spatial distribution of promised greenness score [Grn] of each target 
projects. A dark-green color indicates the highest greenness score 3.0, and a pale-green color 
indicates the lowest greenness 0.0 (see the legend on the figure). In the following sections, 
these evaluated [Grn] promised greenness scores shall be analyzed with [EnvD] 
environmental destruction level (section 5.3) and [Prc] price level (section 5.4). 
 
 
StartYear CompYear
(1) Green
Project Name
(2) Green
Planning and
Concepts
(3) Other
Green-
features
Promised
Greenness
Score
Actual Green Words and Features
(Reference of all sentences here is in the appendix section)
2005 Completed 0 1 0 1
is an exclusive bungalow only enclave located in the prime residential area of Nusajaya
….its picturesque lake vistas and lush green central park while its 24-hour security creates
a sanctuary for your total peace of mind.
Completed 0 1 0 1 nestled amid green surrounds., The exclusive residential enclave
2015 0 1 0 1
Conceptualized as a 'green' enclave..., it is designed with environmental sustainability in
mind...,
2015 0 1 0 1
Nestled among the jaded greens.., a lush canvas for reconnnection with nature...,
'Greenery' that greets you all around…, is set within a green environment that blends
nature to offset the normal hustle and bustle of city living.
2015 0 1 0 1
Nestled among the jaded greens.., a lush canvas for reconnnection with nature...,
'Greenery' that greets you all around…, is set within a green environment that blends
nature to offset the normal hustle and bustle of city living.
2015 0 0 1 1 Sutera Go Green
Ongoing 0 0 1 1
lush green parks
1997 Ongoing 0 0 1 1
*A large central park* Set amidst natural surrounding, the township comes complete with 2
recreational parks with 5 lakes that enhances the beauty of the immediate environment.
2002 Completed 0 0 0 0
2010 2013 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 *Minimum Price (/sf) was culculated by using estimated Built-up size (1500).
1981 2014 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
? 0 0 0 0
Old 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0
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[Fig 12] Spatial distribution of [Grn] of each target Iskandar projects  
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5.3. Environmental destruction and promised greenness  
At the entire Iskandar level (general tendency): 
First of all, this section shall explain the classification method of EVI values in this thesis 
project and its validity. Figure 13.1 shows an actual distribution of all EVI classes (from 1 to 
12) within the Iskandar region in 2013 Day 321 with the shape of rough urban areas. Figure 
13.2 shows a satellite image of the same geographical extent in order to be compared to the 
EVI distribution and urban shapes on the left panel. A comparison between two maps tells us 
that 4 - 6 EVI classes roughly correspond to urban areas and could-be barren lands. On the 
other hand, class 7 -12 EVI classes roughly correspond to dense vegetation. 
 
[Fig 13.1: Left panel] Actual distribution of all EVI classes (from 1 to 12) within the 
Iskandar region 
[Fig 13.2: Right panel] Satellite image of the same geographical extent 
 
Keeping these classified EVI values in mind, then, we shall see an actual change of vegetation 
during 2000 and 2013. Figure 14 below shows a comparison of the distribution of EVI classes 
between the day 65 of 2000 and the day 65 of 2013 within the entire Iskandar region. Overall, 
within and around five flagships and Danga bay zones, massive losses of vegetation are 
detected between 2000 and 2013. A huge decrease of vegetation within Nusajaya is also 
clearly observed. Because such vegetation losses are mainly detected within and around the 
urban promotion zones (see the legend on the figure), Iskandar urban development is highly 
likely responsible for the observed decrease of vegetation.  
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[Fig 14] Comparison of the distribution of EVI classes between the day 65 of 2000 and 
the day 65 of 2013 within the entire Iskandar region 
 
In order to more precisly analyze these vegetation losses, a change of the total number of 7-12 
EVI classes (corresponding to high-density vegetation) was calculated. Figure 15 (Top panel) 
shows historical movements of the sum of class 7 - 12 EVI values (equal to dense vegetation) 
within the entire Iskandar region (A: black curve) and within the prime and second urban 
promotion zones (B: dot curve). A gradual downward trend, especially after 2006, is observed 
both in (A) and (B). Figure 15 (Bottom panle) shows a historical trend of (B) minus (A), 
which means differences between vegetation change within the entire Iskandar and the urban 
promotion zones. A gradual downward trend on this graph empirically reveals that the 
vegetation density within the urban promotion zones has been decreasing much quicker than 
that within the entire Iskandar region. This outcome suggests that intensive and rapid urban 
development within the urban promotion zones affects (is responsible for) such a quick and 
massive decrease of vegetation. These empirical analyses prove that a massive destruction of 
vegetation has been ongoing within the entire Iskandar region, and it is safely concluded that this 
destruction is mostly due to urban development projects related to Iskandar Malaysia project. 
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[Top panel on Fig 15] Historical movements of the sum of class 7 - 12 EVI values within 
the entire Iskandar region and within the prime and second urban promotion zones 
[Bottom panel on Fig 15] Historical trend of (B) minus (A) 
 
The next section studies a relation between vegetation destruction [EnvD] and promised 
greenness score [Grn] by taking a closer look at the target Iskandar projects mainly situated 
within Nusajaya. An important note here is that the outcome attained in the next section is 
already slightly biased. This is because, as it was shown, Nusajaya is one of the major 
vegetation-losing areas (see again Figure 14), thus, target projects located in Nusajaya likely 
show a higher level of environmental destruction [EnvD]. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the 
following sections, environmental destruction level of each project differs from each other, 
and it is important to study whether there is a relation between such a difference in the 
[EnvD] level and the promised greenness score [Grn]. 
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Summary of Empirical Findings: 
• A massive destruction of vegetation has been ongoing within the entire Iskandar region, 
five flagships and Danga bay zones, in partiuclar, show a huge decrease of vegetation. 
• The density of vegetation within the urban promotion zones has been decreasing much 
quicker than that within the entire Iskandar region. 
• Thus, Iskandar-related urban projcet are highly likely responsible for the massive 
destruction of vegetation within the region.  
 
At the 38 target project level: 
Figure 16 below shows both absolute loss of vegetation (green colors) [Ab-EnvD] and 
percent loss of vegetation (values on the map) [%-EnvD] of each target project. The actual 
source date of this map and of the following analyses is shown in Appendix. B. Note that due 
to their smaller size of project site, seven projects are technically not able to attain EVI 
values, and thus omitted from this analysis. An important note here is that a smaller number 
of absolute vegetation loss [Ab-EnvD] (km2) of a project does not necessarily mean that the 
project is low environmental impact. This is because there is a possibility that the project site 
was already low-vegetation before the project has started. As for the percentage [%-EnvD], 
even though many projects show nearly 100 % reduction of vegetation, there are also some 
projects showing a low destruction rate. Figure 17 and 18 indicate relationships between the 
absolute loss of vegetation and greenness score, and the percent loss of vegetation and 
greenness score. 
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[Fig 16] [Ab-EnvD] (green colors) and [%-EnvD] (values on the map) of each target project (total 31) 
 
 
[Fig 17] Relationship between [Ab-EnvD] (km2) and [Grn] of each target project 
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First, let us focus on Figure 17 that shows a relationship between [Ab-EnvD] (km2) and [Grn]. 
Because the scale of [Ab-EnvD] of each project is very different from project to project, the 
y-axis is displayed in the logarithmic manner. The graph shows a moderate positive 
relationship 1: the environmental destruction level and the promised greenness, namely 
[Grn]↑∧ [Ab-EnvD]↑. Even though it is hard to conclude a causal relationship between two 
variables as mentioned in the methodology section, this moderate positive relationship 
between [Grn] and [Ab-EnvD] empirically supports urban greenwashing function (1): to 
manage green pressures both from the demand and regulation sides by obscuring 
environmental damages caused by an urban project, convincing the regulation and demand 
sides, and justifying the project.  
 
 
[Fig 18] Relationship between [%-EnvD] and [Grn] of each target project 
 
Then, let us focus on Figure 18 that shows a relationship between [%-EnvD] and [Grn]. Note 
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that a blue curve on the panel is just a visual aid to make a pattern easier to be recognized, 
thus no statistical meaning. The graph shows a positive relationship that clearer than the 
previous [Ad-EnvD]-[Grb]. The more portion (percentage) of vegetation within a project site 
was lost, the higher promised greenness score of the project becomes, namely [Grn]↑∧ 
[%-EnvD]↑. This outcome convincingly supports urban greenwashing function (1). This is 
because if sustainable urban projects really tried to mitigate environmental damage 
(=vegetation loss), the pattern on the graph must become opposite (the less portion of 
vegetation within a project site was lost, the higher promised greenness score of the project 
becomes, namely [Grn]↑∧ [%-EnvD]↓). In accordance with the definition in this thesis, 
projects plotted around ‘GW’ on the graph are perfect examples of urban greenwashing. So, 
we now empirically detected the existence of urban greenwashing projects. Another intriguing 
point is that, on the left side of the panel (around ‘?’), there are three plots showing [Grn] 
scores above 0 (1~2) while showing very low [%-EnvD] (0 % ~ 20%). Unfortunately, these 
particularities can be explained either by (1) the construction site was already developed 
before 2000; or (2) the project is really new and large, and cutting down trees are ongoing 
right now. 
 
Summary of Empirical Findings: 
• A moderate positive relationship, namely [Grn]↑∧ [Ab-EnvD]↑, was observed. 
• A clear positive relationship, namely [Grn]↑∧ [%-EnvD]↑, was observed. 
• These empirical outcomes support urban greenwashing function (1) in our framework. 
Thus, we detected the existence of urban greenwashing Iskandar projects, in accordance 
with our definition.  
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5.4. Price level and promised greenness 
At the entire Iskandar level (general tendency): 
As explained in the section 4.3, comprehensive and complete data of property price in the 
Iskandar region is hard to attain because IRDA does not publicly provide such information. 
Thus, based upon information on property websites, property price level (median square feet 
price) at each Taman (town) level was estimated (Figure 19 below). Due to the lack of data, 
the estimation is not perfectly accurate and completed, but it is reliable enough to detect a 
general trendcy of price levels trend and a spatial distribution of such price levels in the region. 
As Figure 19 indicates, the towns within and around Nusajaya zone show relatively higher 
price levels similar to the towns within and around the central business distric. This can be 
explaind by facts that (1) they tend to contain quite new developments; (2) they are close to 
Kota Iskandar, a new political-administrative center; and (3) they have convenient access to 
the secondary link to Singapore. (2) and (3) are predicted by the bid rent theory, a theory that 
“asssumes a trade-off between the cost of land and distance from the city center, rent bids 
generally decreasing with increasing distance from the center” (Pacione 2009:675). 
 
Based upon this price data, a price rank of 131 towns was calculated (Figure 20 below). 
According to Figure 20, the maximum median sf price is 659.5 RM, and the median of the 
median sf price is 198.5 RM. Thus a range of property selling price between 300 ~ 400 RM / 
sf seems relatively expensive, and the prices above 401 RM / sf seems very luxurious. 
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[Fig 19] Distribution of the median square feet (sf) price of all types of properties by 
town level (as of 2015 February) 
Note: A strong-red color indicates higher median sf price, and a weak-red color indicates 
lower median sf price.  
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[Fig 20] Price range of all types of properties by each town level 
Note: It indicates the median sf price (black curve), 25 % interquartile sf price (blue curve), 
and 75 % interquartile sf price (red curve). 
 
In order to analyze a relationship between each town’s median sf price level and each town’s 
distance from three important geographical points (link1-CBD, lin-2, and Kota Iskandar), the 
next Figure 21 plots a combination of the sf price level and the shortest distance from three 
points (from link 1, link 2, or Kota Iskandar) of each town. The curve of this scatter plot 
roughly follows the curve pattern predicted by the bid rent38 theory (c.f., Pacione 2009:141), 
and thus, generally speaking, a distance from Link-1 (CBD), Link-2, or Kota Iskandar is an 
important determinant factor of the property prices in the real estate market of the Iskandar 
region. 
 
                                            
38 As its name clearly shows, the bid rent theory predicts a relation ship between the rent level and the distance form a CBD 
of a study unit (e.g., district, town). Thus, this Figure 21, which plots a combination of and the median sf price and the 
shortest distance of each town (or project), is just an approximation of the theory. 
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[Fig 21] Combination of the shortest distance from three important points and the price 
level of each town 
Note: This curve roughly follows what the bid rent theory predicts. 
 
Summary of Empirical Findings: 
• Relatively higher price levels within and around Nusajaya zone can be explaind by facts 
that (1) they tend to contain new developments; (2) they are close to Kota Iskandar; and 
(3) they have a convenient access to Link-2. 
• The median of the median sf price is 198.5 RM. A range of property selling price 
between 300 ~ 400 RM / sf seems relatively expensive, and the prices above 401 RM / sf 
seems very luxurious. 
• Generally speaking, a distance from Link-1 (CBD), Link-2, or Kota Iskandar is an 
important determinant factor of the property prices in the real estate market of the 
Iskandar region. 
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At the 38 target project level: 
Figure 22 below shows a spatial distribution of middle prices of the target Iskandar housing 
projects. Note that one project has no official price data (indicated on the map as “No Data”). 
Thus, a total number of samples for this analysis is 37. The actual source date of this map and 
of the following analyses is shown in Appendix. C. Relative to the property price levels 
shown previously, the Iskandar-related projects within and around Nusajaya zone show 
outstandingly expensive price levels (337 RM / sf ~ 914 RM / sf). Nusajaya zone contains 
many new green-field projects that plan to supply a large number of properties to the market 
in the near future. It can be explained that such an oversupply39 of properties (as some news 
articles mentioned in the section 4.1 point out) and a convenient access to Kota Iskandar and 
Link-2 (as pointed out in the previous section) make Nusajaya property market very 
competitive. 
 
 
[Fig 22] Spatial distribution of middle prices of the target Iskandar housing projects 
                                            
39 Generally speaking, the oversupply of a certain type of product makes an average price of such product lower. However, 
in the Iskandar case, the property bubble is still barley keeping its shape (as of 2015 April), and the higher price level of new 
properties may be supported by the (so-far) continuous flow of speculative capital. 
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Figure 23 below shows a relationship between [Grn] and [Prc], more specifically, deviations 
from the median of the mid prices of 37 samples and [Grn] of 37 target projects. As Figure 23 
shows there is a strong positive relationship between [Grn] and [Prc]. Accordingly, this 
outcome supports a positive relation of [Grn]↑∧ [Prc]↑.  
 
 
 
[Fig 23] Relationship between [Grn] and [Prc] of each target project 
 
As we have seen in the “general tendency” section, the shortest distance of each project from 
important geographical points (Link-1, Link-2, or Kota Iskandar) is an influential determinant 
factor of the price level. As it was shown, there is also a positive relationship between [Prc] 
and [Grn]. Thus, it is worthwhile to analyze a relationship between [Grn], [Dis], and [Prc] in 
order to think about a causal relation between these three variables. Figure 24.1 and 24.2 
below show the results of this analysis. 
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[Fig 24.1: Left panel] Relationship between [Dis] and [Prc] of each target project 
[Fig 24.2: left panel] Relationship between [Dis] and [Grn] of each target project 
 
Figure 24.1 shows combinations of [Prc] the mid prices and [Dis] the shortest distance of 
each target project. The plot pattern on the figure shows that the mid price of each target 
project follows the bid-rent curve that I have discussed in the previous section. Based on this 
result, I can safely say that the shortest distance from the important points is a strong 
determinant factor of the price levels of the 37 targets. 
 
On the other hand, Figure 24.2 shows combinations of the shortest distance [Dis] and the 
promised greenness score [Grn]. Intriguingly, the distribution of plots is similar to the 
[Prc]-[Dis] curve of the target projects (compare the left and the right distributions of plots). 
Figure 25 below shows that to what extent each plot on the two different graphs 
corresponds to each other. This figure clearly shows that [Prc] and [Grn] values of each 
target urban project are distributed very similarly when they are aligned based on [Dis]. This 
implies a causal relationship between [Dis]-[Prc]-[Grn]. 
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[Fig 25] Correspondence between the adjusted [Grn] and the adjusted [Prc] based on 
[Dis] 
Note: [Grn] and [Prc] values were adjusted so that the maximum value of them will be 1, 
namely all [Grn]s divided by the maximum [Grn] value 3 and all [Prc]s divided by the 
maximum [Prc] 915. 
 
How can this correspondence be explained? A possibility is that [Dis] affects both [Prc] and 
[Grn]. Based on the bid-rent theory, it is reasonable to think of [Dis]→[Prc] (means [Dis] 
determines or affects [Prc]). However, it sounds not so plausible to think of [Dis]→[Grn]. 
There is another logical possibility that the shortest distance from the important points is a 
determinant factor of vegetation loss [EnvD], and thus [Dis] affects [Grn] via [EnvD]. The 
rational of this is that an area in close proximity to, say, the Link-1, is likely subjected to more 
frequent developments due to its convenient accessibility to the Link-1. However, this also 
sounds not so plausible because the areas close to the important points not necessarily have 
intense vegetation. Figure 16 shows that there are several projects that indicate a high level of 
[Ab-EnvD] and [%-EnvD] while their “shortest distance” is much longer than that of other 
projects. Then, the most plausible explanation of this similarity of pattern is to imagine a 
causal chain of [Dis]→[Prc]→[Grn], which means that a distance determines or affects a 
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price, and then the price determines or affects a promised greenness score of a target project. 
This suggests that the higher a property price becomes, the higher the promised greenness 
score may become. 
 
How can this conclusion be interpreted? As discussed in the very beginning of this section, 
the real estate market in and around Nusajaya is highly likely very competitive. This fierce 
competition imposes the real estate developers to make their projects as attractive as possible 
to the latent consumers in order to win such a harsh competition. Some projects may 
emphasize “water-front” and “super-luxurious” (based on my observation, condominiums in 
Iskandar tend to employ such strategies), and large-scale housing projects, where a 
naturalized (in the Baudrillard’s sense40) nature remains, tend to emphasize their greenness. 
Namely, the promised greenness of such projects is a mere tool to keep projects attractive, 
and thus market competitiveness, and to justify their higher pricing in the intense market. 
 
Summary of Empirical Findings: 
• A strong positive relationship, namely [Grn]↑∧ [Prc]↑was observed. 
• [Dis]-[Prc] and [Dis]-[Grn] show a plot pattern similar to each other. According to the 
bid-rent theory, we assumed [Dis]→[Prc]. Thus, the most plausible explanation of this 
similarity is to think a causal chain of ([Dis] →) [Prc]→[Grn], which suggests that the 
higher a property price may become, the higher a promised greenness score of a project 
becomes. This implies that promised greenness is used for keeping the 
price-competitiveness of a project within a harsh market like Nusajaya. 
• These empirical outcomes support urban greenwashing function (2): keeping or increasing 
the market competitiveness, and thus, exchange value, of a capitalist urban project. 
                                            
40 Baudrillard wrote that “‘naturalization’ effect we constantly meet in the environment – the effect which consists in 
restoring nature as sign after it has been eliminated in reality. Thus, for example, a forest is cut down to build a group of 
buildings, which then given the name ‘Park Estate’ and a few trees are planted to create a ‘natural’ feel” (1998:89). 
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5.5. Final synthesis between [EnvD], [Prc], and [Grn] 
A critical reader will make an argument on this project that the relationship between [Grn] 
and [Prc] does not necessarily have something to do with urban greenwashing. According to 
our definition in this thesis, the environmental performance of properties (new residential 
projects) is evaluated by [EnvD], and thus, it makes sense to consider (within our framework) 
that a project having a high [EnvD] and a high [Grn] as an urban-greenwashing project. 
However, in order to conclude that a high value of [Grn] of an expensive project (namely a 
high-[Prc] project) is related to urban greenwashing, we must confirm that that project also 
has a high value of [EnvD]. In other words, in order to logically connect the relation between 
[EnvD]-[Grn] with the relation between [Grn]-[Prc], we must analyze a relation between all 
three variables we analyzed, namely [EnvD], [Grn], and [Prc]. The outcome of such an 
analysis is displayed in Figure 26 below. 
 
As the figure clearly shows a positive relationship between all three variables, namely, 
[EnvD] ↑∧[Grn]↑∧[Prc]↑. Although, as I noted several times, it is not safe to definitively 
conclude the casual relation between these three variables, based on all empirical analyses 
made by this thesis, I can safely conclude that there are urban greenwashing function (1) 
confirmed by the observed positive relation between [EnvD] ↑∧[Grn]↑; urban greenwashing 
function (2) confirmed by the observed positive relation between [Grn]↑∧[Prc]↑; and these 
two functions (relations) are logically related with each other: an urban project showing 
low-environmental performance tends to have higher [Grn] and [Prc]. 
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[Fig 26] Synthesized relationships between [Av-EnvD], [Grn], and [Prc] of each target 
project 
Note: The source data of this graph is shown in Appendix.D. 
 
 
Part. III: Conclusions and Further Possibilities 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions: 
Throughout the theoretical considerations and analyses presented in this thesis, the potential 
and real functions of urban greenwashing in capitalist production of urban space have been 
theoretically and empirically scrutinized. Green-field urban development projects are an 
indispensable component of capitalism in order to sustain capital accumulation and cope with 
over-accumulation crises. However, as the concern for eco-climatic issues grows within 
capitalist societies, capitalist urban projects, especially green-field ones, are exposed to green 
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pressures and demands due to their associated eco-climatic impacts. One possible pathway for 
capitalists to cope with such green pressures and demands is to reconcile capital accumulation 
(through production of urban space) with sustainability by techno-fixes. However, the 
feasibility and the effectiveness of such sustainable capitalist cities that rely heavily on 
techno-fixes are quite questionable. This is because of (1) a possibility of the Jevons paradox, 
(2) the socio-politico nature of modern technology, (3) unequal availability of cutting-edge 
technology, and (4) a fundamental conflict between conceptions of true sustainability and the 
logic of capitalist accumulation. Various scholars even argue that sustainable “capitalist cities” 
are an oxymoron or a myth. Thus, I assumed that an effective (and more pragmatic) strategy 
for capitalists to manage both green pressures and demands is to greenwash their urban 
projects.  
 
Based on Delmas and Burbano’s greenwashing framework, I theorized that, disseminating 
‘promised’ greenness, a capitalist (green-field) urban project is able not only to avoid or 
mitigate green pressures but also to maintain market competitiveness and increase the 
exchange values of its produced space by appealing to green demands. Based on this 
argument, I constructed a framework of urban greenwashing that has two major functions: (1) 
obscuring environmental damages caused by a project; (2) maintaining or increasing 
exchange values of that project. These two functionalities were translated into two empirically 
testable relations: (1’) higher level of environmental destruction and higher promised 
greenness in the marketing tools of capitalist urban projects ([EnvD]↑∧ [Grn]↑); and (2’) 
higher promised greenness and higher price levels of the projects ([Grn]↑∧ [Prc]↑). These 
two relations were empirically detected in this study of the Iskandar Malaysia project.  
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As for (1’), our empirical analyses detected that there is a moderate positive relationship 
between [Ab-EnvD]↑∧ [Grn]↑. In addition, a clear positive relationship, namely 
[%-EnvD]↑∧ [Grn]↑, was observed. These empirical outcomes support urban greenwashing 
function (1). Furthermore, I empirically observed clear examples of ‘greenwashed’ urban 
projects in terms of our definition. As for (2’), our empirical analyses detected that there is a 
strong positive relationship between [Grn]↑∧ [Prc]↑. In addition, [Dis]-[Prc] and [Dis]-[Grn] 
scatter plots show similar patterns. Because our analyses revealed that, both regional (the 
entire Iskandar) and local (target projects) trends of property prices roughly follow the bid 
rent theory (which suggests [Dis]→[Prc]), the most plausible explanation of this similarity is 
to imagine a causal chain of ([Dis]→) [Prc]→[Grn], which means that a property price 
determines or affects the promised greenness score. This implies that promised greenness 
serves to enhance price-competitiveness of a project (or, to justify expensive prices of the 
project) within an intense market like Nusajaya. These empirical outcomes support urban 
greenwashing function (2). Finally, a positive relationship between all three variables, namely, 
[EnvD] ↑∧[Grn]↑∧[Prc]↑, was observed. In other words, the stronger the positive 
relationship between [EnvD] and [Grn] becomes, the stronger the positive relationship 
between [Grn] and [Prc] becomes. This outcome supports that a project whose environmental 
performance is low (relative to other competitors) tends to have a higher promised greenness 
level, and, at the same time, this project also tends to have a higher price level compared to 
other competitors. 
 
7. Further Possibilities: 
In section 4.2, I discussed that a crucial methodological weakness of this study is the 
spatial-numerical reductionism of urban greenwashing phenomenon, which ignores the fact 
that urban greenwashing is, in reality, developed and implemented by a group of project 
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stakeholders within a web of complex social interactions. Thus, this study cannot reveal the 
actual ‘intentions’ of those who are engaging in urban greenwashing (e.g., real estate 
developers), which is one of the key elements to understand the causality of [Grn]-[EnvD] 
and [Grn]-[Prc] positive relations. In order to improve this weak point, as a further study, it is 
desirable to conduct interviews with real estate developers and other beneficiaries in order to 
know whether or not they intentionally utilize urban greenwashing strategies. 
 
Other possible studies are to analyze other sustainable “capitalist” urban projects within the 
urban greenwashing framework developed by this study, and compare the outcomes. Because 
this study is exclusively about Iskandar Malaysia project, the empirical outcomes of this study 
cannot be generalized potentially due to geographical, historical, cultural, social, and 
economic contexts unique to the Iskandar region. In order to improve such a point, it should 
be confirmed whether we could attain similar empirical outcomes in several case studies 
different from the Iskandar Malaysia in terms of geographical, historical, cultural, social, and 
economic factors. 
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Appendix. A 
Data Source for the Promised Greenness Evaluation (Online-available official websites, a 
master plan, documents, brochures, and ads on the real estate information websites): 
 
Property Name Data Source for the Promised Greenness Evaluation 
Setia Eco Gardens • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Setia-Eco-Gardens 
• http://www.setiaecogardens.com.my/ 
• http://www.iproperty.com.my/propertylisting/2937833/setia-eco-garden-gelang-pata
h-semi-detached-house-forsale 
Eco Botanic • http://www.ecoworld.my/ecobotanic/ 
• http://www.propertywtf.com.my/johor-southern-region-f47/ecoworld-eco-botanic-nu
sajaya-johor-t2322.html 
• http://iskandarproperties.info/2013/09/22/eco-botanic-nusajaya-by-eco-world-balloti
ng-session-22nd-sep-10am/ 
• http://property.malaysiamostwanted.com/projects/eco-botanic-the-coleshill-2-storey-
cluster-house 
• http://www.thestar.com.my/Business/Business-News/2013/09/24/Eco-Worlds-Iskand
ar-gem-Its-maiden-project-EcoBotanic-gets-good-response/?style=biz 
• http://www.theborneopost.com/2014/10/05/ecoworld-holds-premium-property-exhib
ition-at-rh-hotel/ 
Setia Eco Cascadia @ 
Taman Setia Indah 
• http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Setia-Eco-Cascadia 
• http://www.cascadia.com.my/the-project.aspx 
Avira Garden Terrace, 
Medini 
• http://www.avira-medini.com.my/ 
• http://aviramedini.com.my/ 
• http://www.malaysiapropertynews.com.my/2014/09/avira-garden-terraces-medini-jo
hor-eo-.htm 
• http://slpintl.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ebrochure_Avira-Product.pdf 
http://slpintl.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Avira-Factsheet-MT-amend-17-Ju
ne-2014.pdf 
• http://property.malaysiamostwanted.com/projects/avira-medini-iskandar-garden-terra
ces 
East Ledang • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/East-Ledang 
• http://www.eastledang.com/beta/this-is-how-living-space-should-be.html 
• http://www.nusajayacity.com/residential/res_east.html 
Leisure Farm Resort 
Residence 
• http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/leisure_farm_resort_residence/5985 
• http://leisurefarm.com.my/vlt/ 
• http://www.leisurefarm.com.my/flash/ 
Horizon Hills • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Horizon-Hills 
• http://gamudaland.com.my/horizonhills/ 
Sunway Iskandar, 
Medini 
• http://www.sunwayiskandar.com/projects_citrine.html 
• http://sunwayiskandar.com/pdf/citrine-ebrochure.pdf 
• http://www.iskandarinvestment.com/investment-opportunities/medini-projects/ 
Nusa Idaman • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Nusa-Idaman 
• http://www.nusaidaman.com/ 
Bukit Indah 1 and 2 • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Bukit-Indah 
• http://www.bukitindahjohor.com.my/ 
• http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/D'Fronde-@-Bukit-Indah 
• http://thissit.com/Projects-Taman-Bukit-Indah-2-Project-41.aspx 
• http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/bukit_indah 
• http://www.archicentre.com.my/work.php?id=andprojectid=20 
Taman Kempas Utama • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Oleander-@-Kempas-Utama 
• http://www.kempasutama.com/index.php 
• http://property.malaysiamostwanted.com/projects/kempas-utama-phase-2-serissa-twi
n-villa 
Ledang Heights • http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/ledang_heights/2394 
• http://my-home.com.sg/ledang-heights/ 
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• http://www.iskandarinvestment.com/master-planned-development-projects/surroundi
ng-developments/ 
• http://www.iproperty.com.my/property/searchresult.aspx?t=Sandgpt=ARandst=andct
=andk=Ledang+Heightsandpt=andmp=andxp=andmbr=andxbr=andmbu=andxbu=an
dlo=andwp=andwv=andwa=andht=andau=andsby=apzandpg=1 
• http://maritime.bernama.com/news.php?id=161170andlang=en 
Nusa Sentral • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Nusa-Sentral 
• http://www.countryview.com.my/projects-nusasentral.html 
Taman Nusa Duta • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Nusa-Duta 
• http://projects.ijmland.com/projectdetail.aspx?Proj_ID=17#.VQTVqoGG-vM 
• http://cdnprojects.ijmland.com/fileupload/property/2-Storey_Bungalow_House_-_Ty
pe_B/brochure/brochure.pdf 
Mutiara Mas (OPAL 
ROYAL) 
• http://www.scientex.com.my/web/property/sk-opal-royal 
• http://www.scientex.com.my/web/img/property/skudai/brochure_opalroyal.pdf 
Mutiara Mas (OPAL 
IMPERIAL) 
• http://www.scientex.com.my/web/property/sk-opal-royal 
• http://www.scientex.com.my/web/img/property/skudai/brochure_opalroyal.pdf 
Taman Sutera Utama • http://www.tanahsutera.com/residential-homes-in-taman-sutera-sutera-utama-7.aspx 
• http://www.propwall.my/classifieds/717429/taman-sutera-utama-skudai-house-for-sa
le-by-jeff-yap?tab=property 
Phase 9D and 9E @ 
Taman Desa Tebrau 
• http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Phase-9D-%7C-9E-@-Taman-Desa-Tebrau 
• http://www.plenitude.com.my/mini/?option=com_contentandview=articleandid=9 
• https://www.cloudhax.com/property/details/12708/Taman-Desa-Tebrau-%28Phase-9
D-9E%29 
Chantique Phase 2 @ 
Taman Pelangi Indah 
• http://www.madabouthomes.my/properties.php?pid=12 
Taman Nusantara • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Nusantara 
• http://deniadevelopment.blogspot.se/ 
• http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/taman_nusantara/3379 
Taman Nusa Bayu • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Nusa-Bayu 
• http://www.nusabayu.com/index.php 
• http://www.nusajayacity.com/residential/res_nb.html 
Taman Nusa Perintis 1 • http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/taman_nusa_perintis_1/3380?tab=classifieds 
Taman Nusa Perintis 2 • http://www.propwall.my/classifieds/1262276/taman-nusa-perintis-2-nusajaya-house-
for-sale-by-davis-dharma 
Nusa Indah • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Nusa-Indah 
• http://www.countryview.com.my/projects-nusaindah.html 
Taman Tan Sri Yaacob No Information 
Taman Nusa Bestari 1 • http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/taman_nusa_bestari_1?tab=property 
• http://www.iproperty.com.my/property/searchresult.aspx?t=Sandgpt=ARandst=andct
=andk=Taman+Nusa+Bestariandpt=andmp=andxp=andmbr=andxbr=andmbu=andxb
u=andlo=andwp=andwv=andwa=andht=andau=andsby=apandpg=1 
Taman Nusa Bestari 2 • http://www.iproperty.com.my/property/searchresult.aspx?t=Sandgpt=ARandst=andct
=andk=Taman+Nusa+Bestari+2andpt=andmp=andxp=andmbr=andxbr=andmbu=and
xbu=andlo=andwp=andwv=andwa=andht=andau=andns=1andsby=apz 
Taman Nusa Jaya • http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/taman_nusa_jaya 
Casa Almyra • http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/casa_almyra 
• http://iskandarproperties.info/2014/09/06/casa-almyra-a-secretly-hidden-mediterrane
an-styled-treasure/ 
Taman Laguna • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Laguna 
Taman Perling • http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/taman_perling/2388?tab=property 
Taman Sutera • http://www.propwall.my/nusajaya/taman_sutera/2389 
• http://www.keppelland.com.sg/RE-MY-Taman-Sutera-TS.asp 
Rosa Terraces 2 • http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Rosa-Terraces-2 
• http://www.udaland.my/download/rosa.pdf 
UDA Heights • http://www.udaland.my/download/udaheights.pdf 
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Taman Seri Orkid • http://www.glamo.my/seriorkid03.html 
• http://www.property.cc/Iskandar-360/Seri-Orkid 
Taman Ungku Tun 
Aminah 
• http://www.propwall.my/skudai/taman_ungku_tun_aminah/3216 
Taman Scientex @ Pasir 
Gudang (PINE 
SIGNATURE 3) 
• http://scientex.com.my/web/property/pg-pine-signature3.aspx 
Taman Scientex @ Pasir 
Gudang (ASTANA 3) 
• http://scientex.com.my/web/property/pg-astana3.aspx 
 
 
Appendix. B 
The source data of [EnvD]-[Grn] analyses 
 
FID Property_Name Area (km2) [Grn] [Ab-EnvD] [%-EnvD] 
1 Taman Nusantara 0.83 0 0.5000 75.47 
2 Taman Nusa Bayu 0.51 0 1.5800 94.74 
3 Setia Eco Gardens 1.04 3 3.7000 86.80 
4 Taman Nusa Perintis 1 1.12 0 0.3000 96.00 
5 Taman Nusa Perintis 2 5.26 0 0.0300 100.00 
6 East Ledang 1.51 2 1.4500 94.31 
7 Ledang Heights 0.32 1 0.0600 20.00 
8 Leisure Farm Resort Residence 6.87 2 -0.1800 0.00 
9 Horizon Hills 1.05 2 5.5900 86.46 
10 Eco Botanic 0.54 3 0.1000 88.89 
11 Sunway Iskandar, Medini 0.27 2 0.9100 19.41 
12 Avira Garden Terrace, Medini 0.47 2.5 0.7400 93.65 
13 Nusa Sentral 0.30 1 0.4300 75.56 
14 Nusa Idaman 1.31 2 0.8100 84.42 
15 Nusa Indah 0.84 0 0.3300 100.00 
16 Bukit Indah 1 and 2 1.13 2 1.9000 97.44 
17 Taman Tan Sri Yaacob 3.92 0 0.2100 100.00 
18 Taman Nusa Bestari 1 1.66 0 0.8000 95.52 
19 Taman Nusa Bestari 2 4.11 0 0.1600 100.00 
20 Taman Nusa Jaya 0.92 0 0.4100 100.00 
22 Taman Nusa Duta 3.95 1 0.3100 100.00 
23 Taman Laguna 0.33 0 0.1300 100.00 
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24 Taman Perling 4.27 0 0.3800 65.22 
25 Taman Sutera 2.41 0 0.0500 33.33 
30 Taman Seri Orkid 1.46 0 0.0600 50.00 
31 Taman Sutera Utama 6.49 1 1.3500 83.08 
32 Taman Ungku Tun Aminah 5.73 0 0.2800 100.00 
35 Phase 9D and 9E @ Taman Desa Tebrau 0.51 1 0.6900 65.48 
36 Chantique Phase 2 @ Taman Pelangi 
Indah 
1.56 1 0.5600 83.33 
37 Setia Eco Cascadia @ Taman Setia Indah 2.97 3 0.9500 100.00 
38 Taman Kempas Utama 4.32 2 1.1500 78.63 
 
 
Appendix. C 
The source data of [EnvD]-[Grn] analyses 
 
FID Property_Name [Grn] [Dis] Min 
(MR/sf) 
DEV 
from 
MED 
[Prc] Max 
(MR/sf) 
1 Taman Nusantara 0 0.083 149 -149 240 331 
2 Taman Nusa Bayu 0 0.069 133 -217 172 210 
3 Setia Eco Gardens 3 0.102 293 221 610 928 
4 Taman Nusa Perintis 1 0 0.083 150 -80 309 469 
5 Taman Nusa Perintis 2 0 0.064 328 -22 367 406 
6 East Ledang 2 0.037 239 306 695 1152 
7 Ledang Heights 1 0.045 550 177 567 583 
8 Leisure Farm Resort Residence 2 0.049 418 313 703 988 
9 Horizon Hills 2 0.039 333 525 915 1496 
10 Eco Botanic 3 0.041 504 462 851 1198 
12 Avira Garden Terrace, Medini 2.5 0.029 No data 482 871 No data 
13 Nusa Sentral 1 0.055 164 -151 238 312 
14 Nusa Idaman 2 0.051 281 137 526 771 
15 Nusa Indah 0 0.059 320 -107 282 244 
16 Bukit Indah 1 and 2 2 0.056 210 133 522 835 
17 Taman Tan Sri Yaacob 0 0.074 142 -247 142 143 
18 Taman Nusa Bestari 1 0 0.065 250 -52 338 425 
19 Taman Nusa Bestari 2 0 0.071 226 -33 356 486 
20 Taman Nusa Jaya 0 0.072 351 57 446 542 
21 Casa Almyra 0 0.068 179 -8 381 583 
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22 Taman Nusa Duta 1 0.063 265 137 527 789 
23 Taman Laguna 0 0.063 279 24 413 548 
24 Taman Perling 0 0.049 381 129 518 656 
25 Taman Sutera 0 0.070 92 -116 273 455 
26 Rosa Terraces 2 0 0.080 322 7 396 471 
27 UDA Heights 0 0.076 430 72 462 493 
28 Mutiara Mas (OPAL ROYAL) 1 0.097 404 117 506 608 
29 Mutiara Mas (OPAL IMPERIAL) 1 0.097 370 74 463 556 
30 Taman Seri Orkid 0 0.089 167 -78 311 455 
31 Taman Sutera Utama 1 0.091 212 -17 372 532 
32 Taman Ungku Tun Aminah 0 0.098 147 -226 163 179 
33 Taman Scientex @ Pasir Gudang 
(PINE SIGNATURE 3) 
0 0.151 249 -75 315 380 
34 Taman Scientex @ Pasir Gudang 
(ASTANA 3) 
0 0.151 248 -111 278 308 
35 Phase 9D and 9E @ Taman Desa 
Tebrau 
1 0.100 221 -127 262 304 
36 Chantique Phase 2 @ Taman Pelangi 
Indah 
1 0.119 205 -100 290 374 
37 Setia Eco Cascadia @ Taman Setia 
Indah 
3 0.118 317 271 660 1004 
38 Taman Kempas Utama 2 0.110 246 0 389 533 
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Appendix. D 
The source data of the synthesis between[EnvD]-[Grn]-[Grn]  
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